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How and Why International Law Binds
International Organizations
Kristina Daugirdas*
For decades, controversy has dogged claims about whether and to what extent international law binds
international organizations (“IOs”) like the United Nations and the International Monetary Fund. The
question has important consequences for humanitarian law, economic rights, and environmental protection.
In this Article, I aim to resolve the controversy by supplying a theory about when and how international
law binds IOs. I conclude that international law binds IOs to the same degree that it binds states. That is,
IOs are not more extensively or more readily bound; nor are they less extensively or less readily bound. This
means that IOs, like states, are not bound by treaties without their consent, with some very narrow
exceptions that apply to states and IOs alike. It means that IOs, like states, are bound by jus cogens
rules, which are mandatory for states and IOs alike. And it means that IOs, like states, are bound by
general international law—but only as a default matter. Like states, IOs may contract around such
default rules, except to the extent that individual IOs lack the capacity to do so because of their limited
authorities.

Introduction
Which international law rules bind international organizations?1 Does the
Security Council have a legal obligation to prevent genocide?2 Does the International Monetary Fund have an obligation to ensure that its loan conditions do not impede borrowing states’ efforts to provide an education?3 Must
the World Trade Organization recognize the precautionary principle in international environmental law? The charters of the United Nations, the
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. For helpful comments and discussions, I thank Nicholas Bagley, Michael Barr, Lori Damrosch, Tom Dannenbaum, Alicia Davis, Monica
Hakimi, Daniel Halberstam, Jim Hathaway, Steve Hill, Don Herzog, Nico Howson, Jan Klabbers,
Karen Knop, Catharine MacKinnon, Steve Mathias, Siobhán McInerney-Lankford, Julian Davis Mortenson, Victor Mosoti, Sean Murphy, Richard Primus, Maurizio Ragazzi, Steve Ratner, Don Regan, Mathias
Reimann, Omri Sender, Sonja Starr, Paul Stephan, Michael Van Alstine, and participants in the Fourth
Annual Junior Faculty Forum for International Law and the 2014 American Society of International Law
Midyear Research Meeting.
1. This Article uses the definition of international organizations articulated by the International Law
Commission: “an organization established by a treaty or other instrument governed by international law
and possessing its own international legal personality.” Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations with Commentaries art. 2(a), in Report of the International Law Commission on Its Sixtythird Session, ¶ 87, U.N. Doc. A/66/10 (2011), to be reprinted in [2011] 2. Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n (forthcoming) [hereinafter IO Responsibility Articles].
2. See José Alvarez, Review of Dan Sarooshi, International Organizations and Their Exercise of Sovereign
Powers, 101 Am. J. Int’l L. 674, 677–78 (2007) (describing this as a hard question).
3. Compare Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors 148–51
(Gráinne de Búrca et al. eds., 1st ed. 2006) (arguing in the affirmative) with François Gianviti, Economic,
Social, and Cultural Human Rights and the International Monetary Fund 113, 121–22 in Non-State Actors and Human Rights (Philip Alston ed., 2005) (arguing in the negative).
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IMF, and the WTO do not clearly impose these obligations. Nor are these
IOs party to treaties that impose such obligations. So if these obligations
bind these IOs—and many commentators think they do—it must be for
another reason.
This Article considers two possibilities. One is that these treaty provisions reflect customary international law or general principles (collectively,
general international law),4 and that general international law binds IOs as
well as states. Indeed, the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) has averred
that “[i]nternational organizations are subjects of international law, and, as
such, are bound by any obligations incumbent upon them under general
rules of international law.”5 Many scholars echo this language and affirm
that general international law binds IOs.6 But this one sentence hardly settles the matter.7 Closer inspection reveals that the ICJ’s statement lacks any
support, and the ICJ’s precise legal conclusion is also unclear.8 Some scholars
continue to think that whether customary international law binds IOs at all
is a hard question, while others suggest that only a subset of general international law binds IOs.9
The second possibility is that treaties can bind IOs even when they are
not parties and have not consented. But whether treaties can bind IOs under
these circumstances is disputed. On the one hand, the view that IOs are
automatically bound by their member states’ treaty obligations is in tension
with IOs’ separate, independent legal personality. Additionally, the 1986
Vienna Convention on the Law of IO Treaties (“VCLT-IO”) says that treaties do not bind IOs without their consent.10 On the other hand, the VCLTIO remains controversial and, nearly thirty years after its adoption, has failed
to attract enough ratifications to enter into force.11 In the meantime, several
scholars—including the authors of a leading treatise on IOs—have insisted
that IOs can be so bound.12
As it stands, significant disagreement and uncertainty persists about
which international law rules bind IOs and which rules IOs can legally ig4. See infra notes 29–31.
5. Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 Between the WHO and Egypt, Advisory Opinion, 1980 I.C.J. Rep. 73, 89–90 (Dec. 20) [hereinafter WHO-Egypt Advisory Opinion].
6. See infra note 34 and accompanying text.
7. See discussion infra Part I.A.1; see also Jan Klabbers, The Paradox of International Institutional Law, 5
Int’l Org. L. Rev. 151, 165 (2008) (“[T]he discipline may claim, following the ICJ in 1980, that
international organizations are subjects of international law, and thus also subject to international law,
but it remains unclear which international law and why: there is no plausible theory of obligation.”).
8. See infra notes 35–45 and accompanying text.
9. See supra note 2; infra notes 46–50 and accompanying text.
10. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Between States and International Organizations or
Between International Organizations art. 34, opened for signature Mar. 21, 1986, 25 I.L.M. 543 (1986)
(not yet in force) [hereinafter VCLT-IO] (“A treaty does not create either obligations or rights for a third
State or a third organization without the consent of that State or that organization.”).
11. Thirty-five states must become parties before the VCLT-IO enters into force; so far, only thirtyone have done so. See id. art. 85.
12. See infra notes 61–68 and accompanying text.
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nore. To resolve these competing claims, this Article offers a theory of how
and why international law binds IOs. This Article’s central claim is that
international law binds IOs to the same degree that it binds states. That is,
IOs are not more extensively or more readily bound; nor are they less extensively or less readily bound. This means that IOs, like states, are not bound
by treaties without their consent, subject to some very narrow exceptions
that apply to states and IOs alike. It means that IOs, like states, are bound
by jus cogens rules. And it means that IOs, like states, are bound by general
international law—but only as a default matter. Like states, IOs may contract around such default rules, except to the extent that individual IOs lack
the capacity to do so because of their limited authorities.
At bottom, the debate about IOs’ legal obligations boils down to this
question: when and why should obligations that were created by states and
for states also bind IOs?13 To begin to answer this question, it is helpful to
consider IOs’ relationship to states in the international legal system. A defining feature of IOs is that they are simultaneously in a vertical and a horizontal relationship with states. IOs are subordinate to states because states
are the entities that create, sustain, and—potentially—dismantle IOs (the
vertical relationship). States are the principals, IOs are the agents. At the
same time, IOs are separate legal persons under international law with a
significant degree of autonomy (the horizontal relationship). Among other
things, IOs can call states to account for violations of international obligations using the same methods that states, as sovereign equals, use to resolve
disputes among themselves. In addition, comprehensive immunity shields
IOs from the regulatory authority of individual states. Both features distinguish IOs from other nonstate actors, including corporations and nongovernmental organizations (“NGOs”).
The vertical relationship suggests that IOs are appropriately characterized
as vehicles through which states operate. The horizontal relationship, by
contrast, suggests that IOs are states’ peers on the international plane. Of
course, these two perspectives are not genuinely dichotomous. No IO is
purely a vehicle, and no IO is wholly autonomous. The two conceptions are
13. Whether IOs can contribute to making customary international law is also contested. The International Law Commission has recently begun to tackle the question. See Michael Wood (Special Rapporteur
on the Formation and Evidence of Customary International Law), Second Report on Identification of Customary International Law, ¶¶ 43–44, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/672 (May 22, 2014); Int’l Law Comm’n, Identification of Customary International Law: Text of the Draft Conclusions Provisionally Adopted by the
Drafting Committee, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.869, at 2 (July 14, 2015) (“In certain cases, the practice of
international organizations also contributes to the formation, or expression, of rules of customary international law.”). Some scholars have suggested that IOs should be bound by customary international law
only to the extent that they can contribute to making customary international law. See infra notes 49–50
and accompanying text. But this need not necessarily be the case. Armed opposition groups, for example,
are bound by customary international humanitarian law, but on most accounts they do not have any role
in shaping the content of customary international humanitarian law. See Anthea Roberts & Sandesh
Sivakumaran, Lawmaking by Nonstate Actors: Engaging Armed Groups in the Creation of International Law, 37
Yale J. Int’l L. 107 (2012).
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poles at the ends of a wide spectrum.14 Some IOs will be closer to the peer
end, perhaps because of their resources or authorities. Others will be closer
to the vehicle end, perhaps because of their decision-making structure or
limited membership.15 Indeed, the same IO might look more like a peer or
more like a vehicle depending on the angle from which it is scrutinized.
Focus on the Secretary-General, and the United Nations looks more like a
peer; focus on the Security Council or the General Assembly, and it looks
more like a vehicle.
These two conceptions correspond to two distinct apprehensions that motivate the arguments about IOs’ obligations. If IOs are conceived as vehicles
through which states operate, the fear is that states might exploit IOs to
evade their international obligations.16 If IOs are conceived as peers, however, the underlying concern is quite different: states have created entities
with significant authorities and power that states do not or cannot fully
control. This latter concern might be labeled the Frankenstein problem.17
Both conceptions of IOs lead to the same conclusion about their international obligations: general international law and treaties bind IOs to the
same degree that they bind states. In other words, I argue that regardless of
whether IOs are seen as peers or vehicles, the same international obligations
bind them. By building the theoretical infrastructure for that conclusion
from these two diverging perspectives, I hope to address the concerns raised
by those who doubt that general international law binds IOs. In addition,
the Article explains why the view that treaties can bind IOs without their
consent is untenable in the vast majority of cases.
Drawing on these theoretical foundations, this Article turns to a practical
and underappreciated question: what do IOs themselves think? A number of
IOs have in fact communicated their views on the scope of their interna14. There may be IOs that do not fit neatly along this spectrum. For example, it may not capture the
relationship between the EU and its member states because the EU has some features of supranational
governance. But those very features have caused some scholars to suggest that the EU should not be
understood as an IO. See, e.g., Armin von Bogdandy, Neither an International Organization nor a Nation
State: The EU as a Supranational Federation, in The Oxford Handbook of the European Union (Erik
Jones et al. eds., 2012).
15. The vehicle perspective may seem especially appropriate for an IO like NATO, for example, in
light of its limited membership and the rule that its twenty-eight member states must reach consensus
before making important decisions. See Int’l Law Comm’n, Responsibility of International Organizations:
Comments and Observations Received from International Organizations, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/637, at 11–12 (Feb.
14, 2011) [hereinafter Responsibility of International Organizations].
16. August Reinisch, Securing the Accountability of International Organizations, 7 Global Governance
131, 134 (2001) (“Where states cooperate well and use an international organization as a vehicle to carry
out activities that they themselves may be prevented from engaging in either under their domestic law or
under international law, the lack of substantive and procedural restraint may pose a serious problem. This
is where the lawyers’ interest in protecting against worst-case scenarios begins.”).
17. Others have made this comparison. The epigraph to Jan Klabbers’s casebook is a quotation from
Mary Shelley: “You are my creator, but I am your master; obey!” Jan Klabbers, Introduction to
International Institutional Law (2d ed. 2009); see also José E. Alvarez, International Organizations as Law-makers 585 (2005); Andrew Guzman, International Organizations and the Frankenstein
Problem, 24 Eur. J. Int’l L. 999 (2014).
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tional obligations to the International Law Commission (“ILC”).18 In these
comments, participating IOs have staked out a position that tracks this Article’s theoretical conclusions. They have emphatically rejected the possibility that treaties bind them without their consent. They have, at times,
directly endorsed the conclusion that they are bound by jus cogens and customary international law. Finally, participating IOs have asserted that their
charters constitute lex specialis—that is, that their charters reflect action by
states to alter the application of customary international law or general principles by elaborating or carving out exceptions to it. The view that IO charters constitute lex specialis necessarily rests on the understanding that general
international law binds IOs except to the extent that those IOs or their
member states have contracted around it. In other words, there is some evidence that IOs themselves recognize that general international law binds
them, but only as a default matter.
At the end of the day, then, states enjoy wide latitude to create lex specialis
and to adjust the legal obligations that bind the IOs they establish. States
can exercise that discretion to create IOs that are free to ignore certain international rules vis-à-vis their member states. States might choose to do so
because they believe that such institutions will be more efficient or effective
at achieving their policy goals.19 The result may be problematic along some
dimensions: IOs that are licensed to ignore certain international norms
might undermine those norms or work at cross-purposes to policy goals that
states are advancing in other arenas.20 But such conflicts are an inevitable
feature of an international legal system that is based largely on state consent.
Although IOs are creatures of international law, it does not follow that they
are obliged to follow or reinforce all international norms.
That said, states’ discretion to fashion IOs is not unlimited. States cannot
create IOs that are authorized to violate jus cogens. Nor can states establish or
act through IOs to erase general international law obligations they owe to
nonmember states. It is one thing for a group of states to establish an IO and
authorize it to disregard certain general international law obligations in its
18. The ILC is a subsidiary body that the General Assembly created in 1947 to fulfill its responsibility under the Charter to initiate studies and make recommendations for the purpose of encouraging the
codification and progressive development of international law. See U.N. Charter art. 13. The ILC is made
up of thirty-four expert members with “recognized competence in international law” who serve in their
personal capacities rather than as representatives of their States of nationality. Statute of the International
Law Commission arts. 2(1), 3, Nov. 21, 1947. No two members of the Commission may be nationals of
the same state, and, in electing the members, the General Assembly must ensure that the “main forms of
civilization” and the “principal legal systems of the world” are represented. Id. arts. 2(2), 8.
19. See infra note 78 and accompanying text; cf. W. Michael Reisman, Through or Despite Governments:
Differentiated Responsibilities in Human Rights Programs, 72 Iowa L. Rev. 391, 395 (1986) (“[T]here is a
limit to ‘institutional elasticity,’ i.e., the extent to which institutions created and still used for other
purposes can be ‘stretched’ in order to get them to perform human rights functions, especially when
those functions are accomplished at the expense of their manifest functions.”).
20. See, e.g., Siobhán McInerney-Lankford, Human Rights and Development: Regime Interaction and the
Fragmentation of International Law, 4 World Bank Legal Rev. 123 (2013) (arguing that the absence of
policy coherence across human rights and development regimes is problematic).

R

\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLI\57-2\HLI206.txt

330

unknown

Seq: 6

1-NOV-16

9:13

Harvard International Law Journal / Vol. 57

interactions with its member states. It is another thing altogether for states
to use an IO to sidestep their international obligations to states that are not
participating in the IO. In the end, this Article’s account of IO obligations
does not promise to eliminate all conflicts in the international legal system;
sometimes IOs’ obligations will diverge from those of their member states,
and sometimes IOs will lack obligations to advance goals that states pursue
through other treaties or IOs. But in concluding that certain obligations
bind IOs with respect to both member and nonmember states this Article
seeks to ensure that IOs do not become devices for undermining the international legal system.21
I. Disputes and Uncertainty About IO Obligations
A. Disputes and Uncertainty
A sampling of IO charters highlights their ambitious goals: “international peace and security,”22 “the attainment by all peoples of the highest
possible level of health,”23 and “long-range balanced growth of international
trade,”24 to name just a few. Even as IOs contribute to achieving these goals,
the possibility that they might either exacerbate the problems they were
meant to alleviate or cause harm along the way has in recent decades gained
more and more attention.25 Demands for “IO accountability” have
mounted. There are various ways to define accountability and to try to ensure IOs are accountable.26 One way is to look to international law. The
sources of states’ international law obligations are well known: they include
treaties, customary international law, and general principles.27 But whether
and when these sources bind IOs is mired in uncertainty. If we do not know
what IOs’ international obligations are, we do not know when IOs have
violated them. As August Reinisch put it at the 2015 Annual Meeting of
the American Society of International Law, when it comes to IOs, it is only a
“little bit exaggerating” to say that “we don’t know what the wrongful acts
are.”28
21. Cf. infra note 183 and accompanying text.
22. U.N. Charter art. 1, ¶ 2.
23. Constitution of the World Health Organization art. 1, July 22, 1946.
24. Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development art. 1, Feb.
16, 1989.
25. See, e.g., Kristina Daugirdas & Julian Davis Mortenson, United States Defends United Nations’ Immunity in Haitian Cholera Case, 108 Am. J. Int’l L. 819 (2014) (describing lawsuit relating to U.N.
peacekeepers as the most likely source of a cholera epidemic that has sickened more than 700,000 people
and killed more than 8500).
26. See generally Ruth W. Grant & Robert O. Keohane, Accountability and Abuses of Power in World
Politics, 99 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 29 (2005); Richard B. Stewart, Remedying Disregard in Global Regulatory
Governance: Accountability, Participation, and Responsiveness, 108 Am. J. Int’l L. 211 (2014).
27. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, 33 U.N.T.S.
993 [hereinafter I.C.J. Statute]; see also Alvarez, supra note 17, at 47–49.
28. August Reinisch, Adapting to Change: The Role of International Organizations, 2015 ASIL Annual
Meeting (Apr. 20, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4fW-YR6HqW0.
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1. General International Law
General international law combines two sources of law found in article 38
of the ICJ statue: customary international law and general principles.29 Customary international law emerges where there is a general and consistent
state practice that states follow from a sense of legal obligation.30 Exactly
which rules fit into the general principles category is murkier. As traditionally conceived, general principles include those legal principles “derived
from, and evidenced by, the consistent provisions of various municipal legal
systems—principles in foro domestico—which can be validly transposed into
international law.”31 Some scholars argue that obligations to protect fundamental human rights are binding as general principles.32 This Article’s argument does not turn on resolving the debate about which rules qualify as
general principles or the debate about whether any particular norm is more
appropriately characterized as customary international law or a general
principle.
Scholars have taken a range of positions about whether and how general
international law binds IOs. Some hesitate to stake out a position at all,
considering it a hard question. Others argue that only a subset of general
international law binds IOs. Still others suggest not only that the entire
corpus of general international law binds IOs, but also that these rules constitute mandatory rather than default rules for IOs.
A single sentence in the ICJ’s 1980 WHO-Egypt advisory opinion supplies
the foundation for many analyses of IO obligations under general international law. In full, it reads:
International organizations are subjects of international law and,
as such, are bound by any obligations incumbent upon them
under general rules of international law, under their constitutions
or under international agreements to which they are parties.33

29. To be a bit more precise, general international law excludes “special” customary international law
norms that bind only small numbers of states, such as states in a particular region. Joost Pauwelyn,
Conflict of Norms in Public International Law 148–49, 155–57 (2003).
30. See I.C.J. Statute, supra note 27, art. 38(1)(b); Restatement (Third) Foreign Relations Law
§ 102(3) (1987) (“Customary international law results from a general and consistent practice of states
followed by them from a sense of legal obligation.”); Int’l Law Comm’n, Identification of Customary
International Law: Text of the Draft Conclusions Provisionally Adopted by the Drafting Committee,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.869, at 1 (July 14, 2015) (“To determine the existence and content of a rule of
customary international law, it is necessary to ascertain whether there is a general practice that is accepted as law (opinio juris).”). On whether IO practice and opinio juris count for purposes of ascertaining or
making customary international law, see supra note 13.
31. Pauwelyn, supra note 29, at 125; see also James C. Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees
Under International Law 26–28 (2005).
32. See Bruno Simma & Philip Alston, The Sources of Human Rights Law: Custom, Jus Cogens, and General
Principles, 12 Aust. Y.B. Int’l L. 82–83 (1989).
33. WHO-Egypt Advisory Opinion, supra note 5, ¶ 37.
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Paraphrasing this key sentence, a number of scholars have affirmed that general international law binds IOs.34 But others are less sure. One source of
doubt that the WHO-Egypt opinion settles the question is the dearth of state
and IO practice supporting its conclusion.35
A closer look at the WHO-Egypt opinion reveals additional reasons why it
cannot settle the question about IOs’ obligations—or even shed much light
on it. The case arose when Arab states sought to transfer a World Health
Organization (“WHO”) regional office away from the city of Alexandria
after Egypt agreed to the Camp David Accords with Israel.36 (Arab states
numerically dominated the WHO regional committee charged with overseeing the Alexandria office.37) Egypt protested that such a transfer would violate a 1951 treaty it had signed with the WHO. Other states argued that
the 1951 treaty did not apply to the transfer decision. The ICJ did not
resolve this question; instead, it asserted that the “true legal question” was
which legal principles and rules governed the relocation of regional offices.38
The ICJ stated that IOs are bound by general rules of international law in
the course of a paragraph that makes the obviously correct and rather trivial
point that IOs lack an absolute right to select the location of their headquarters or a regional office:
States for their part possess a sovereign power of decision with
respect to their acceptance of the headquarters or a regional office
of an organization within their territories; and an organization’s
power of decision is no more absolute in this respect than is that
of a State. As was pointed out by the Court in one of its early
Advisory Opinions, there is nothing in the character of international organizations to justify their being considered as some form
34. See, e.g., Olivier De Schutter, Human Rights and the Rise of International Organisations, in Accountability for Human Rights Violations by International Organisations 51, 72–73 (Jan
Wouters et al. eds., 2010) (“We may conclude that international organizations, as subjects of international law, must comply with general public international law in the exercise of their activities, and that
this includes a requirement to comply with the Universal Declaration on Human Rights as general
principles of law.”); Eyal Benvenisti, The Law of Global Governance 99 (2014) (“[A]s an international person, an [IO] is subject to general international law. Therefore [IOs] are subject to customary
international law and general principles of law.”); Reinisch, supra note 16, at 136 (“[S]trong arguments
in favor of an obligation to observe customary law may be derived from more general reflections concerning the status of the UN as an organization enjoying legal personality. It has been forcefully stressed that
the Security Council is ‘subject to’ international law because the UN itself is a ‘subject of’ international
law, and this reasoning may be applied more generally to other international organizations.”).
35. Alvarez, supra note 2, at 677.
36. As explained in the Written Statement made to the ICJ by the Syrian Arab Republic, “[t]he cause
of the increasingly tense and troubled situation obtaining in the Eastern Mediterranean Region, which
has made it necessary to transfer the regional office, lies in the agreements signed at Camp David in the
United States of America on 27 September 1978. WHO-Egypt Advisory Opinion, supra note 5, ¶ 2
(dissenting opinion by Morozov, J.).
37. Constitution of the World Health Organization arts. 46–47, 50, July 22, 1946; WHO-Egypt
Advisory Opinion, supra note 5, at 85, ¶¶ 28–29.
38. WHO-Egypt Advisory Opinion, supra note 5, at 88, ¶ 5; see also infra notes 215–18 (describing
the ICJ’s conclusion about the principles and rules applicable to the possible transfer).
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of “super-State.” International organizations are subjects of international law and as such, are bound by any obligations incumbent
upon them under general rules of international law, under their
constitutions or under international agreements to which they are
parties.39
The ICJ’s opinion offers nothing to bolster its statement that IOs, as subjects of international law, are bound by general rules of international law.
Equating being a subject with being bound by general international law is
hardly obvious. As the universe of entities with rights or obligations (or
both) under international law has expanded beyond states and IOs to include
individuals and armed opposition groups, both the prerequisites and the
consequences of being a subject of international law have grown increasingly
contested.40
Even accepting the ICJ’s conclusion, it is difficult to wring much content
from it. After all, the ICJ wrote that IOs are bound by “any obligations
incumbent upon them under general rules of international law.”41 Maybe all of
general international law is “incumbent upon” IOs. But maybe only some
(unspecified) subset is. The phrase “general rules of international law” compounds the confusion because the ICJ has not used this term (or its many
variations) consistently.42 Sometimes the term refers to customary international law and general principles.43 Other times the term refers to norms
that are mandatory and binding without exception.44 Still other times it is
used as a synonym for customary international law.45
Jan Klabbers has argued that WHO-Egypt is best read to indicate that only
a subset of general international law binds IOs. In his view, that subset
includes rules on the “making, application, and enforcement” of international law, such as rules about treaty law or responsibility, and excludes
rules that require, permit, or prohibit particular conduct.46 According to
Klabbers, the ICJ probably did not intend to suggest that all of customary
international law binds IOs. Had the ICJ meant to do so, he argues, the ICJ
39. WHO-Egypt Advisory Opinion, supra note 5, at 89–90, ¶ 37 (citation omitted).
40. As a result, some scholars endorse discarding the “subject” concept altogether. See, e.g., Rosalyn
Higgins, Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use It 49 (1994) (arguing
that the notion of “subjects” and “objects” of international law has “no credible reality” and serves “no
functional purpose”).
41. WHO-Egypt Advisory Opinion, supra note 5, at 89–90, ¶ 37 (emphasis added).
42. See G.M. Danilenko, Law-making in the International Community 9–10 (1993) (noting
various ways that the term “general international law” and similar variations are used); see also Prosper
Weil, Towards Relative Normativity in International Law, 77 Am. J. Int’l L. 413, 436–37 (1983) (same).
43. Danilenko, supra note 42, at 9–10; see also Weil, supra note 42, at 436–37.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Jan Klabbers, Book Review, 11 Int’l Org. L. Rev. 235, 237 (2014) (reviewing Guglielmo
Verdirame, The UN and Human Rights: Who Guards the Guardians? (2011)); see also Jan Klabbers, The Sources of International Organizations Law, in The Oxford Handbook on Sources of International Law (forthcoming).
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would have done so explicitly.47 After all, in 1980, when the ICJ issued its
opinion, the prospect of wrongdoing by IOs was still seen as “a remote,
largely hypothetical, possibility.”48 Moreover, Klabbers argues, the view
that customary international law rules created by and for states might bind
other actors contravenes the very concept that customary international law
results from “the aggregate of activities of the members of a political community.”49 If all customary international law binds IOs, he argues, there is a
troubling misalignment between IOs’ obligations and their limited ability
to contribute to making customary international law.50
WHO-Egypt thus fails to resolve which international law rules bind IOs,
and the question remains unsettled. But even if there were agreement about
which rules bind IOs, scholars have disagreed about whether those rules are
mandatory or default rules.51 Some have affirmed that states can contract
around general international law when establishing IOs,52 but others have
suggested they cannot53—or at least expressed some sympathy for the view
that they cannot.54
47. Klabbers, Book Review, supra note 46, at 237.
48. Id.
49. Klabbers, The Sources of International Organizations Law, supra note 46.
50. Id. (“Surely, if one is to become bound by a customary rule, it is only fair that one is also in a
position to contribute to its formation—yet with international organizations this possibility is practically
ruled out on topics other than those falling within the competences of the organization.”). But see
Clapham, supra note 3, at 28 (arguing that general international law can bind IOs without IOs having
any role in making those rules); see also supra note 13.
51. The WHO-Egypt opinion does not speak to this question, nor do some of the scholars who have
written about IO obligations. See, e.g., Clapham, supra note 3; De Schutter, supra note 34. These authors
may not have addressed the question because they have focused on IOs’ human rights obligations, and
states and IOs may not be able to contract around such norms even if they do not have jus cogens status. See
infra note 131 and accompanying text.
52. See Daniel Halberstam & Eric Stein, The United Nations, the EU, and the King of Sweden, 46 Common Mkt. L. Rev. 13, 21 (2009) (arguing that the United Nations is bound by customary international
law as well as general principles of law, “at least to the extent that the UN Charter does not provide
otherwise”); Dapo Akande, The International Court of Justice and the Security Council: Is There Room for
Judicial Control of Decisions of the Political Organs of the United Nations?, 46 Int’l & Comp. L.Q. 309, 320
(1997) (“Where the Charter gives the Council a right to derogate from international law it is clear that
that right exists. Where no express permission is given the right does not exist.”).
53. Tomuschat starts with the proposition that IOs must be bound by jus cogens norms like the ban on
the use of force in the U.N. Charter: “If states could evade this central rule of today’s legal order by
founding an international organization, it would soon totally lose its practical impact.” Christian Tomsuchat, Ensuring the Survival of Mankind on the Eve of a New Century, 62 Recueil des Cours 23, 135
(1999). He then argues that the “constraints” on IOs include “ordinary norms” as well as jus cogens
norms. Id. at 135–36. States can contract around such ordinary customary international law norms if they
so choose. Thus, for example, states may choose to vary by mutual agreement the rules relating to
territorial seas or exclusive economic zones. By contrast, in his view, it appears that IOs cannot do so, for
the “[l]egal clarity brought about by the UN Law of the Sea Convention and the customary rules which
have emerged against its background should not be susceptible of being undermined by rather simplistic
legal tricks” like the establishment of an IO. Id. at 136.
54. See August Reinisch, Developing Human Rights and Humanitarian Law Accountability of the Security
Council for the Imposition of Economic Sanctions, 95 Am. J. Int’l L. 851, 858 (2001) (“[T]he assumption that
the UN member states could have succeeded in collectively ‘opting out’ of customary international law
and general principles of law by creating an international organization that would cease to be bound by
those very obligations appears rather unconvincing.”).
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In short, the answers that scholars have given to the question of whether
general international law binds IOs include: maybe, sometimes, and always.
2. Treaties
There is also disagreement about whether treaties can bind IOs without
their consent. Treaties do not bind states without their consent; the ability
to pick and choose among treaties is one of the fundamental rights associated with statehood.55 Indeed, if one state can bind another entity to international obligations without the latter’s consent, it is good evidence that the
entity lacks the independence that is a requisite feature of statehood.56 The
1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (“VCLT”) codified this
principle in article 34: “A treaty does not create either obligations or rights
for a third State without its consent.”57 It is known as the pacta tertiis rule.58
According to the VCLT-IO, the pacta tertiis rule also applies to IOs. The
VCLT-IO provides that “[a] treaty does not create either obligations or
rights for a third State or a third organization without the consent of that
State or that organization.”59 But the VCLT-IO has not garnered enough
ratifications to enter into force,60 and a number of scholars disagree with the
VCLT-IO. They take the position that treaties can, at least sometimes, bind
IOs without their consent. One argument is that IOs are “transitively
bound” by their member states’ treaty obligations.61 That is, “an organization formed by states will be bound by the obligations to which the individual states were committed when they transferred powers to the
organization.”62 Alternatively, if states are bound by certain treaty obligations, they cannot create an organization that has the capacity to violate
those obligations.63 In both cases, the rationale is that “no subject of international law may transfer to another subject more powers than those which
55. Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with Commentaries art. 30, in Report of the International Law
Commission on the Second Part of Its Seventeenth Session and on Its Eighteenth Session, U.N. Doc. A/6309/Rev.1
(1966), reprinted in [1966] 2 Y.B. Int’l Law Comm’n 169, 226, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1966.
56. James Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law 71 (2d ed. 2006).
57. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
58. See Christine Chinkin, Third Parties in International Law 25 (1993) (“Treaties bind
consenting parties only, and strangers to any treaty are legally unaffected by it. This is the classic rule of
treaties and third parties: pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt.”).
59. VCLT-IO art. 34, supra note 10.
60. See supra note 11.
61. Frédéric Mégret & Florian Hoffmann, The UN as Human Rights Violator? Some Reflections on the
United Nations Changing Human Rights Responsibilities, 25 Hum. Rts. Q. 314, 318 (2003) (describing the
position that the United Nations is bound by international human rights standards “as a result and to
the extent that its members are bound”).
62. Henry G. Schermers & Niels M. Blokker, International Institutional Law 995,
§ 1574 (4th rev. ed. 2003) (“According to principles of state succession, a new state is often bound by
the obligations of its predecessor. By analogy, an organization formed by states will be bound by the
obligations to which the individual states were committed when they transferred powers to the organization.”); see also infra notes 243–44 and accompanying text (describing additional arguments framed in
terms of functional succession).
63. De Schutter, supra note 34, at 62–63.
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it possesses.”64 Most scholars do not address whether this argument applies
to treaty obligations entered into by all member states, by some fraction of
member states, or by any member state.65
Henry Schermers and Neils Blokker, the authors of a leading treatise on
IOs, are the most prominent exponents of the view that treaties can bind
IOs without their consent, although they do not define the universe of treaties that would automatically bind IOs.66 Schermers and Blokker point out
that IOs’ nonparty status to multilateral treaties does not necessarily indicate a desire not to be bound because multilateral treaties typically permit
only states to become parties.67 They also argue that IOs are more
subordinate to international law than states are because IOs are creatures of
international law.68
B. Illustrating the Stakes
To illustrate the stakes of the debate over IOs’ obligations and the range
of settings in which such debates have arisen or could arise, this section sets
out three concrete examples regarding economic rights, humanitarian law,
and environmental protection.
1. Conflict Underway: The IMF and Economic Rights
In the wake of World War II, forty-five states established the International Monetary Fund (“IMF”) and the World Bank—institutions that were
“dreamt up by economists on either side of the Atlantic.”69 The IMF was
charged with “promot[ing] international monetary cooperation,”
“facilitat[ing] the expansion and balanced growth of international trade,”
and “shorten[ing] the duration and lessen[ing] the degree of disequilibrium
in the international balances of payments of members.”70 To accomplish
these goals, the IMF “exercise[s] firm surveillance over the exchange rate
policies of members.”71 It also lends money to its members, subject to certain conditions.72
64. Id. at 62 (noting also that this reflects the maxim nemo plus juris transferre potest quam ipse habet).
65. De Schutter argues that, “in principle, such obligations should correspond to any international
obligation of any Member State of the organization, without it being necessary that all the Member
States are bound by the said obligation.” Id. at 64.
66. See Schermers & Blokker, supra note 62.
67. Id. at 995–96, § 1574.
68. Id. (“International organizations, although established by states, have never possessed a potent
legal order of their own. They are established under international law. Their constitutional roots are in
international law. No superiority over international law can be pleaded on their behalf.”).
69. Ngaire Woods, The Globalizers: The IMF, the World Bank, and Their Borrowers 45
(2006).
70. Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund art. I, July 22, 1944, 60 Stat. 1401, 2
U.N.T.S. 39.
71. Id. art. IV.
72. Gianviti, supra note 3, at 134–35.
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For decades, international lawyers have debated what obligations, if any,
the IMF might have to protect the economic rights of individuals. The U.N.
General Assembly first enumerated economic rights in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948. These rights were subsequently incorporated into the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights (“ICESCR”), which was adopted in 1966. Such rights include the
right to work; the right to enjoyment of “just and favourable conditions of
work;” the right to an adequate standard of living, including adequate food,
clothing, and housing; and the right to an education.73 Not all states are in a
position to implement these obligations immediately. Recognizing this, the
ICESCR requires them to take incremental steps toward the “full realization” of the enumerated rights.74
In the 1980s, human rights advocates and scholars began to criticize the
IMF. In their view, the conditions that the IMF imposed on its loans were so
draconian that they inevitably led borrowing states to violate their ICESCR
obligations.75 This concern has persisted. In 1999, for example, the Committee on Economic and Social Rights, a group of experts charged with
monitoring states’ compliance with the Convention, asserted that the IMF
and the World Bank “should pay greater attention to the protection of the
right to food in their lending policies and credit arrangements and in international measures to deal with the debt crisis.”76
Policy questions aside, there has been vigorous debate about whether the
IMF is legally bound by international obligations to protect economic rights.
According to François Gianviti, the IMF’s former general counsel, the IMF
has no legal obligations to protect economic rights.77 Indeed, Gianviti argues, an undue short-term focus on economic rights might compromise not
only the IMF’s core mission, but also the realization of economic rights
themselves, at least in the long run.78
The IMF is not a party to the ICESCR. Indeed, the ICESCR’s final clauses
permit accession only by states.79 Some have nevertheless argued that the
IMF has obligations with respect to economic rights because the IMF’s
member states are parties to human rights treaties including the ICESCR.80
73. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights arts. 6–7, 11, 13, Dec. 16, 1966,
993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR].
74. Id. art. 2.
75. See, e.g., Philip Alston, The International Monetary Fund and the Right to Food, 30 Howard L.J. 473,
476 (1987).
76. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 12: The Right to Adequate Food, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1999/5 (1999).
77. See Gianviti, supra note 3.
78. See id. at 130–32, 137.
79. ICESCR, supra note 73, art. 26.
80. Alston, supra note 75, at 479–80 (asserting that there is a “strong legal argument[ ] . . . that the
IMF is obligated in accordance with international law, to take account of human rights considerations”
because its member states “have all ratified various human rights conventions and in accordance with the
relevant principles of international law the IMF ought not to encourage or facilitate a state’s violating
those international legal obligations by encouraging it, or in effect forcing it to enter into an agreement
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This argument is contested on a number of grounds, including that not all
IMF member states are parties to the ICESCR.81
Alternatively, some scholars have argued that the IMF is bound by general international law and that economic rights constitute customary international law or general principles.82 Others disagree with this conclusion,
either doubting that these rules bind the IMF83 or contesting that economic
rights have the status of customary international law or general principles.84
2. Conflict Deferred: The United Nations and International Humanitarian
Law
U.N. peacekeepers operate under the command and control of the United
Nations. Does the United Nations have an international obligation to ensure
that they comply with international humanitarian law? This question first
arose more than a half-century ago, yet the answer remains unclear.
Over the years, the United Nations has taken various measures to ensure
that U.N. peacekeepers do comply with international humanitarian law. A
number of scholars have argued that these steps reflect not only sound policy, but also the United Nations’ legal obligations: peacekeepers must comply with international humanitarian law because customary international
law binds the United Nations.85 Although there is little doubt that many
international humanitarian law rules are part of customary international law
(the U.N. Secretary-General has affirmed as much86), the United Nations
which in fact violates the economic rights of the citizens of that country”); Sigrun I. Skogly, The
Human Rights Obligations of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund 83,
136 (2001) (describing Schermers and Blokker as making a “plausible” argument that treaties can bind
IOs without their consent and concluding that while the IMF “do[es] not assume material or procedural
legal obligations directly from the Economic and Social Rights Covenant, . . . the application of the
Covenant brings more clarity to the substantive content of the human rights standards” that the IMF has
“a negative and neutral obligation not to violate and to respect, according to [its] legal relationship to
the [U.N.] Charter”).
81. See Gianviti, supra note 3, at 113 nn.1 & 115 (explaining that some of the IMF’s members are not
parties to the ICESCR and arguing that “in the event that some or all members of an international
organization adhere to a treaty containing such other objectives or values, this in itself does not result in
these objectives or values becoming part of the organization’s mandate unless and until agreement is
reached to amend the organization’s charter”).
82. Skogly, supra note 80, at 76–79, 84–90, 120–25; Clapham, supra note 3, at 148–51.
83. Klabbers, supra note 7, at 166 (describing the IO literature as “replete with eventually somewhat
unsatisfactory statements holding the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund bound by
human rights because human rights are morally desirable”).
84. Gianviti, supra note 3, at 121–22 (“[I]t is not generally accepted that the [ICESCR] (or the norms
contained in it) form part of general or customary international law.”); see also Reinisch, supra note 54, at
862 (“There is no consensus that the contents of [the ICESCR], as well as the economic rights contained
in the Universal Declaration, can be considered to represent established customary law or general
principles.”).
85. See, e.g., R. Simmonds, Legal Problems Arising from the United Nations Military Operations in the Congo 178–80 (1968); Moshe Hirsch, The Responsibility of International
Organizations Toward Third Parties 36 (1995).
86. See, e.g., U.N. Secretary-General, Report Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808, ¶
35, U.N. Doc S/25704 (May 3, 1993); see also, e.g., Sandesh Sivakumaran, Binding Armed Opposition
Groups, 55 Int’l & Comp. L.Q. 369, 372–73 (2006).
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has conspicuously avoided taking a position about whether it is bound by
those rules.87
By nevertheless requiring peacekeepers to comply with international humanitarian law, the United Nations has kept debates about its legal obligations from coming to a head. This avoidance strategy is common among
IOs; they often comply with international law norms without confirming
that they have an obligation to do so.88 This is one reason why uncertainty
about IOs’ legal obligations has endured for so long.
Shortly after the first U.N. peacekeeping force was established in 1956,
the International Committee of the Red Cross (“ICRC”) wrote to the
United Nations, expressing concern that U.N. peacekeepers were “directly
dependent on the United Nations, which was not, as an Organization, a
party to the [Geneva] Conventions.”89 The ICRC thus proposed issuing instructions to the peacekeepers requiring compliance with the Geneva Conventions.90 In response, U.N. Secretary-General U Thant agreed that those
treaties were important; he affirmed that the “Geneva Conventions of 1949
constitute the most complete standards granting to the human person indispensable guarantees for his protection in time of war or in case of armed
conflict whatever form it may take.”91 Thant went on to say that he had
issued regulations requiring peacekeepers “to respect the principles and the
spirit of the general international Conventions relative to the conduct of
military personnel.”92 Notably, Thant did not say that the Geneva Conventions themselves bound the United Nations, either as a treaty obligation or
as customary international law.93
In 1972, the ICRC proposed amending the Geneva Conventions to allow
the United Nations to accede.94 The United Nations objected:
[Those conventions] contain many obligations that can only be
discharged by the exercise of juridical and administrative powers
which the Organization does not possess, such as the authority to
exercise criminal jurisdiction over members of the Forces, or ad87. See, e.g., Hirsch, supra note 85, at 34; Steven R. Ratner, Foreign Occupation and International Territorial Administration: The Challenges of Convergence, 16 Eur. J. Int’l L. 695, 705 (2005).
88. Kristina Daugirdas, Reputation and the Responsibility of International Organizations, 25 Eur. J. Int’l
L. 991, 1012–14 (2014) (describing other examples of IOs complying with international law norms
without making explicit their reason for doing so); see also Alvarez, supra note 17, at 179.
89. Finn Seyersted, United Nations Forces in the Law of Peace and War 190 (1966).
90. Id.
91. Letter from U Thant, U.N. Secretary-General to Leopold Boissier, President of the International
Committee of the Red Cross (undated), reprinted in 2 Int’l Rev. Red Cross 29 (1962).
92. Id. The regulations for subsequent peacekeeping operations included similar language. See, e.g.,
Secretary-General, United Nations, Regulations For the UN Force in Cyprus, reg. 40, U.N.
Doc. ST/SGB/UNFICYP/1 (Apr. 25, 1964).
93. At least one scholar writing in 1968 concluded that these regulations do “constitute a recognition
of the applicability of the general (or customary) international law of war rather than of those detailed
provisions of the relevant conventions which do not as yet constitute customary international law.”
Simmonds, supra note 85, at 192.
94. See U.N. Secretary-General, Human Rights in Armed Conflict, U.N. Doc. A/8781 (Sept. 20, 1972).
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ministrative competence relating to territorial sovereignty. Thus
the United Nations is unable to fulfill obligations which for their
execution require the exercise of powers not granted to the Organization, and therefore cannot accede to the Conventions.95

Ultimately, the ICRC’s proposal was not adopted.
By the mid-1990s, it became clear that instructing peacekeepers to respect the “principles and spirit” of the Geneva Conventions was not enough.
The trouble stemmed in part from new peacekeeping missions that blurred
the line between peacekeeping and peace enforcement. For example, in Somalia,
the U.N. peacekeepers’ mandate included disarmament, which required the
use of force when arms were not turned over voluntarily.96 Furthermore,
because the peacekeepers were operating in an urban environment, civilians
were often in harm’s way.
Working with the ICRC, the United Nations developed more detailed
rules.97 In 1999, Secretary-General Kofi Annan issued new regulations that
set out in specific, concrete terms the international humanitarian law principles and rules with which peacekeepers had to comply.98 The regulations
also included provisions that are reflected in multilateral treaties but that
probably do not (yet) reflect customary international law, such as prohibitions on methods of warfare intended to seriously damage the natural environment.99 Thus, the new regulations both codified customary international
law and went beyond it. By issuing them, the United Nations drained legal
questions about the source and extent of the United Nations’ obligations of
their urgency.
3. Conflict Anticipated: The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and
International Environmental Law
On June 29, 2015, representatives of fifty-seven states signed an agreement to establish a new regional development bank—the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (“AIIB”).100 China led the effort, seeking to address a
95. Legal Opinion of the Secretariat of the United Nations, Question of the Possible Accession of
Intergovernmental Organizations to the Geneva Conventions for the Protection of War Victims, 1972
U.N. Jurid. Y.B. 153, 154.
96. See S.C. Res. 814, ¶ 7 (Mar. 26, 1993).
97. Daphna Shraga, UN Peacekeeping Operations: Applicability of International Humanitarian Law and
Responsibility for Operations-related Damage, 94 Am J. Int’l L. 406, 407–08 (2000).
98. U.N. Secretary-General, Bulletin on the Observance by United Nations Forces of International Humanitarian Law, U.N. Doc. ST/SGB/1999/13 (Aug. 6, 1999).
99. Shraga, supra note 97, at 408.
100. Simon Denyer, China Launches Development Bank for Asia, Calls It First Step in ‘Epic Journey,’
Wash. Post (June 29, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/china-launches-infrastructurebank-first-step-in-an-epic-journey/2015/06/29/e7d8bd7a-ca11-46fa-9bad-15ba856f958c_story.html.
The AIIB’s articles of agreement entered into force on December 25, 2015, and the AIIB opened for
business on January 16, 2016. See News, Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, http://www.aiib
.org/html/2016/NEWS_0202/92.html.
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massive gap in infrastructure funding in Asia.101 China is supplying about
30% of the Bank’s $100 billion in authorized capital and will exercise just
over 26% of the voting power.102
At least for the time being, the United States does not intend to become
an AIIB member.103 In fact, the United States discouraged its allies from
joining the AIIB, citing a concern that the AIIB would fail to incorporate
the “high standards” of the World Bank and other regional development
banks with respect to governance and environmental and social safeguards.104 Nevertheless, on March 12, 2015, the United Kingdom became
the first major Western state to apply for membership in the AIIB.105
Others soon followed.106
President Obama described the United States’ concerns at a joint press
conference with Japanese Prime Minister Shinzô Abe in April 2015:
As Prime Minister Abe said, the projects themselves may not be
well-designed. They may be very good for the leaders of some
countries and contractors, but may not be good for the actual people who live there. And the reason I can say that is because, in the
past, some of the efforts of multilateral institutions that the
United States set up didn’t always do right by the actual people in
those countries. And we learned some lessons from that, and we
got better at making sure that we were listening to the community and thinking about how this would affect the environment,
and whether it was sustainable.107
Just before prospective founding members met to sign the AIIB’s charter,
Jin Liqun, who headed an AIIB working group and was subsequently named
the AIIB’s President-elect, said the Bank was committed to being “lean,

101. Why China Is Creating a New “World Bank” for Asia, Economist (Nov. 11, 2014).
102. See Press Release, The State Council, The People’s Republic of China, Key Legal Framework Laid
for China-initiated AIIB (June 29, 2015), http://english.gov.cn/news/top_news/2015/06/29/content_281
475136908926.htm.
103. Matthew Yglesias, How a Chinese Infrastructure Bank Turned into a Diplomatic Fiasco for America,
Vox (Apr. 1, 2015), http://www.vox.com/2015/4/1/8311921/asian-infrastructure-investment-bank.
104. UK Support for China-backed Asia Bank Prompts US Concern, BBC (Mar. 13, 2015), http://
www.bbc.com/news/world-australia-31864877 (quoting U.S. National Security Council spokesperson
Patrick Ventrell); Press Release, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Daily Briefing by the
Press Secretary Josh Earnest (Mar. 17, 2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/03/17/
daily-briefing-press-secretary-josh-earnest-031715.
105. UK Announces Plans to Join Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, Gov.uk (Mar. 12, 2015), https://
www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-announces-plans-to-join-asian-infrastructure-investment-bank.
106. Andrew Higgins & David E. Sanger, Three European Powers Say They Will Join China-led Bank,
N.Y. Times, Mar. 18, 2015, at A4; Choe Sang-Hun, South Korea Plans to Join Regional Development Bank
Led by China, N.Y. Times, Mar. 27, 2015, at A12.
107. Press Release, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Remarks by President Obama and
Prime Minister Abe of Japan in Joint Press Conference (Apr. 28, 2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/
the-press-office/2015/04/28/remarks-president-obama-and-prime-minister-abe-japan-joint-press-confere.
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clean, and green.”108 Jin explained that the working group had already
drafted an environmental document for approval by member states.109
Depending on which international law rules bind IOs—and whether
those rules are mandatory or default rules—some environmental policies
might be legally required. The ICJ has held, for example, that general international law requires environmental impact assessments where there is a risk
that a proposed project will have a significant adverse transboundary impact.110 The World Bank and other regional development banks already require environmental impact assessments before they fund projects. If general
international law binds IOs, then the AIIB risks violating international law
unless it imposes a similar requirement.
*
*
*
As this Part has illustrated, many questions persist about which international obligations bind IOs. Moreover, these questions affect a wide range of
IOs and IO activities.
II. IOs as Vehicles
To begin to sort through the competing claims and open questions about
IOs’ obligations, this Part focuses on IOs’ vertical relationship with their
member states—and the conception of IOs as vehicles through which states
act. From the vehicle perspective, the underlying concern is that states will
try to evade their international obligations by acting through IOs.111 There
are at least two ways to try to prevent such evasions. One is to make states
responsible when they act through IOs to violate their obligations.112 Indeed, several rules of state responsibility already seek to ensure that states
cannot avoid the consequences of violating their international obligations by
blaming other actors over which they exercise control.113 For example, a
108. Yangpeng Zheng, AIIB to Be ‘Lean, Clean, and Green,’ China Daily (June 29, 2015), http://
english.gov.cn/news/top_news/2015/06/29/content_281475136774500.htm; Mark Magnier, China’s Jin
Liqun Named President-elect of Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, Wall St. J. (Aug. 24, 2015), www.wsj
.com/articles/chinas-jin-liqin-named-president-elect-of-asian-infrastructure-investment-bank-14404210
17.
109. Zheng, supra note 108.
110. Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Arg. v. Uru.), Judgment, 2010 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶ 204 (Apr.
20).
111. See, e.g., Halberstam & Stein, supra note 52, at 21 (“States cannot simply avoid international
human rights by bringing to life an international organization and charging it with tasks that would
violate human rights standards if undertaken by the members of that organization themselves.”); Reinisch, supra note 16, at 143 (“Stated less politely, one could say that states should not be allowed to
escape their human rights obligations by forming an international organization to do the ‘dirty work.’ ”).
112. Halberstam and Stein argue that one consequence of the principle of noncircumvention is that
“[s]tates may remain liable for the human rights abuses of an international organization that they direct
and control or to which they transfer powers to act on their behalf.” Halberstam & Stein, supra note 52,
at 22.
113. The International Law Commission adopted a set of draft articles on state responsibility in 2001.
Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts with Commentaries,
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state is responsible for internationally wrongful acts that are undertaken (1)
by private corporations empowered by the government or (2) by private actors under the direction or control of the government.114 A state is similarly
responsible when it directs or aids another state in taking actions that would
violate the first state’s international obligations.115 The ILC has explained
that “[t]he essential principle is that a State should not be able to do
through another what it could not do itself.”116
The IO Responsibility Articles likewise include a provision that specifically addresses the risk that states might circumvent their international obligations by acting through an IO. Article 61 provides:
A State member of an international organization incurs international responsibility if, by taking advantage of the fact that the
organization has competence in relation to the subject-matter of
one of the State’s international obligations, it circumvents that
obligation by causing the organization to commit an act that, if
committed by the State, would have constituted a breach of the
obligation.117
Article 61 applies in only a narrow set of circumstances: where a state acts
through an IO with the intent of avoiding its international obligations and
that same state causes the IO to take the action that violates the state’s obligations.118 These limitations render article 61 inapplicable where states lack
the requisite intent (for example, where states simply neglect to consider the
full range of their international obligations when acting in connection with
an IO), or where states lack the power to shape IO conduct unilaterally. Nor
would article 61 apply where IO officials initiate the conduct that violates a
state’s international obligations. Thus, in many cases the link between state
and IO conduct will be too attenuated to pin responsibility on member
states under article 61. For these reasons, article 61 alone does not adequately address the risk of evasion.
U.N. Doc. A/56/10, reprinted in [2001] 2. Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 1–208, 31, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/
2001/Add.1 [hereinafter State Responsibility Articles]. Even at the time that the State Responsibility
Articles were adopted, they were viewed as largely codifying extant customary international law. See
James Crawford (Special Rapporteur on State Responsibility), Fourth Report on State Responsibility, ¶ 23,
U.N. Doc A/CN.4/517 (Apr. 2–3, 2001); David Caron, The Paradoxical Relationship Between Form and
Authority, 96 Am. J. Int’l L. 857 (2002); see also infra notes 296–97 and accompanying text.
114. State Responsibility Articles, supra note 113, arts. 5, 8.
115. Id. arts. 16, 17.
116. Id. art. 17 cmt. 8; see also id. art. 16 cmt. 6 (“A State cannot do by another what it cannot do by
itself.”).
117. IO Responsibility Articles, supra note 1, art. 61.
118. Id. art. 61 cmt. 2 (explaining that the “use of the term ‘circumvention’ ” implies “the existence
of an intention to avoid compliance” and that “[i]nternational responsibility will not arise when the act
of the international organization . . . has to be regarded as an unintended result of the member State’s
conduct”); see also id. art. 61 cmt. 7 (identifying conditions for responsibility under art. 61, including “a
significant link between the conduct of the circumventing member State and that of the international
organization” and stating that “[t]he act of the international organization has to be caused by the member State”).
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A second solution to the evasion problem—which could complement provisions like article 61 of the IO Responsibility Articles—is to impose certain international obligations directly on IOs.119 Scholars and the ILC have
both cited the risk of circumvention to explain why certain international
obligations bind IOs. But they do not necessarily specify or agree about
which obligations bind IOs in order to prevent such circumvention. Some
have limited the argument to a narrow set of obligations.120 Others have
advanced variations of the argument that sweep more broadly.121
This Part argues that the IOs-as-vehicles view, coupled with the concern
about member states evading their own obligations, supports some—but
not all—of the claims that have been made about IO obligations. Some of
these claims founder because they take too broad a view of what constitutes
an evasion. The view that general international law necessarily binds IOs, for
example, suggests that any attempt by states to deviate from these rules
constitutes an evasion. But states actually have considerable latitude to contract around customary international law. Likewise, the view that member
states’ treaty obligations automatically bind IOs ignores the discretion that
states have to modify their treaty obligations and even to enter into conflicting treaty obligations.
Properly understood, the IOs-as-vehicles view leads to the conclusion that
jus cogens norms always bind IOs and that general international law binds
IOs as a default matter. Member states’ treaty obligations, in contrast, do
not automatically bind IOs.
119. Still another possibility would be to attribute IO conduct to states in a broader set of circumstances. Cf. Monica Hakimi, State Bystander Responsibility, 21 Eur. J. Int’l L. 341, 347–49 (2010) (noting that options for expanding responsibility associated with human rights abuses include both assigning
more actors obligations to respect and attributing to states a greater share of such abuses). Attributing all
IO conduct to states could threaten IOs’ independence and their separate legal personality, thereby compromising states’ ability to cooperate to achieve shared goals. Cf. Rosalyn Higgins, The Legal Consequences
for Member States of the Non-fulfilment by International Organizations of Their Obligations Toward Third Parties,
66 Annuaire de l’Institut de Droit International (Session of Lisbonne, vol. 1, 1995, A. Pedone), at 419, ¶
121 (“[I]f members know that they are potentially liable for contractual damages or tortious harm caused
by the acts of an international organization, they will necessarily intervene in virtually all decisionmaking by international organizations. It is hard to see how the degree of monitoring and intervention
required would be compatible with the continuing status of the organization as truly independent, not
only from the host state, but from its membership. If members were liable for the defaults of the organization, its independent personality would be likely to become increasingly a sham.”).
120. Halberstam and Stein argue that one consequence of the principle of noncircumvention is that
the obligations of member states will indirectly bind IOs in a limited set of cases: “when an international
organization exercises the powers formerly belonging to a State or group of States in the context of a
particular international legal regime, then such international organization succeeds that group of States
not only in their rights but also in their obligations under that international regime.” Halberstam &
Stein, supra note 52, at 22–23. They frame this argument in terms of functional succession, which is
addressed in more detail in Part III.B.2.
121. See, e.g., Felice Morgenstern, Legal Problems of International Organizations 32
(1986) (“There is no reason why rules of international law which are generally recognized as applicable
between States and which are not by their nature unsuitable for international organizations should not be
automatically binding on the latter. Such a conclusion has been justified on the grounds that States
bound by rules of international law should not be able to evade them collectively.”); see also supra note 52.
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A. Foundations of the IOs-as-vehicles View
The IOs-as-vehicles view emphasizes the principal-agent nature of the relationship between states and IOs.122 IOs, like every agent, enjoy some discretion. But states remain in charge: they decide to establish IOs, define
their purposes, and determine their authorities. States also play a critical role
in IOs once they are up and running. Through bodies like the U.N. General
Assembly and the Security Council, states set IO policies and select key IO
officials. States also determine the size of IOs’ budgets and how to allocate
them. To be sure, states will not always find it easy to correct course in the
short run when IOs exercise discretion in a way that diverges from states’
preferences.123 In the long run, however, IOs must satisfy their principals or
their principals will restrain or dismantle them.124
At the same time that states play this “outsider” principal role, they
simultaneously play an “insider” role in the IOs they establish. Every IO has
at least one organ that is made up entirely of member states. (The United
Nations has several: the General Assembly, the Security Council, and the
Economic and Social Council.) Not only do states provide critical inputs to
IO decisions, but they often also play a crucial role on the back end in
implementing those decisions. To take an especially significant example, it
is U.N. member states that implement Security Council authorizations to
use force. Thus, while IOs have separate legal personalities as a formal legal
matter, as a practical matter there is no sharp and fundamental distinction
between IOs and their member states.
B. Implications of the IOs-as-vehicles View
If states cannot use IOs as vehicles to evade their own international obligations, what are the implications for IOs’ international obligations? Before
tackling that question, we must first answer another: what exactly counts as
an evasion? I argue that treaty law as codified in the VCLT supplies the
appropriate reference point.125 The rule that follows is straightforward: what
states can do directly by treaty, they can do indirectly through an IO. And
what states cannot do directly by treaty, they cannot do indirectly through
an IO.

122. See, e.g., Tomuschat, supra note 53, at 91.
123. See generally Delegation and Agency in International Organizations (Darren G. Hawkins et al. eds., 2006).
124. See Barbara Koremenos et al., The Rational Design of International Institutions, 55 Int’l Org. 761,
768 (2001).
125. Even at the time it was being drafted, the VCLT was described as a constitution for the international legal system. See Julian Davis Mortenson, The Travaux of Travaux: Is the Vienna Convention Hostile to
Drafting History?, 107 Am. J. Int’l L. 780, 791, 808–09 (2013).
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1. Jus Cogens

On the vehicles view, the explanation for why jus cogens norms bind IOs is
straightforward. As the ILC explained, jus cogens norms must bind IOs as
well as states to prevent states from circumventing their obligations:
[D]espite a personality which is in some respects different from
that of the States Parties to such treaties [that is, treaties that
establish IOs], [IOs] are nonetheless the creations of those States.
And it can hardly be maintained that States can avoid compliance
with peremptory norms by creating an organization.126
While many aspects of jus cogens are contested, it is perfectly clear that
states cannot enter into treaties that violate jus cogens norms.127 Jus cogens
norms bind IOs because states cannot, by treaty, establish IOs that are authorized to violate jus cogens norms.128
2. General International Law
When it comes to customary international law and general principles, the
analysis is more complicated. States are not categorically prohibited from
entering into treaties that derogate from general international law. To the
contrary, it is well established that states can enter into treaties to either
elaborate or modify the general international law rules that would otherwise
govern. Reflecting this capacity, the lex specialis principle provides that when
both a general standard and a more specific rule govern the same subject
matter, the specific rule should take precedence over the general rule.129 Of
course, states’ capacity to create lex specialis is not unlimited. States need to
find willing treaty partners. Even then, states cannot contract around jus
cogens norms.130 And some scholars have argued that certain non-jus cogens
126. Commentary on the Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties Between States and International
Organizations and Between International Organizations, reprinted in [1982] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 56,
art. 53, cmt. 2, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1982/Add.l.
127. VCLT, supra note 57, art. 53 (“A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a
peremptory norm of general international law.”); id. art. 64 (“If a new peremptory norm of international
law emerges, any existing treaty which is in conflict with that norm becomes void and terminates.”).
128. See, e.g., Martti Koskenniemi, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law, ¶ 346, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.682 (Apr. 13, 2006) (“If United
Nations Member States are unable to draw up valid agreements in dissonance with jus cogens, they must
also be unable to vest an international organization with the power to go against peremptory norms.”).
129. See North Sea Continental Shelf (Ger. v. Den. & Ger. v. Neth.), Judgment, 1969 I.C.J. Rep. 3,
43, ¶ 72 (noting that “it is well understood” that “rules of international law can, by agreement, be
derogated from in particular cases, or as between particular parties”); Amoco Int’l Fin. Corp. v. Iran, 15
Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 189 (“As a lex specialis between the two countries, the Treaty supersedes the lex
generalis, namely customary international law.”); Koskenniemi, supra note 128, ¶ 79 (“That treaty rules
enjoy priority over custom is merely an incident of the fact that most of general international law is jus
dispositivum so that parties are entitled to derogate from it by establishing specific rights or obligations to
govern their behavior.”); Pauwelyn, supra note 29, at 212–36.
130. VCLT, supra note 57, arts. 53, 64.
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norms are likewise nonderogable.131 Nevertheless, it is worth emphasizing
that creating lex specialis is not considered a devious and troubling technique
for states to evade obligations under general international law. To the contrary, lex specialis offers states a way to achieve more tailored—and more
effective—regulation.132 Thus customary international law and general principles need not categorically bind IOs the way that jus cogens norms do.133
Few scholars acknowledge this point explicitly134—although, as Part IV explains, it is central to the way IOs view their own charters.
While states have significant flexibility to contract around general international law when they establish IOs, that flexibility is not infinite. One
especially important limitation involves nonmember states. A handful of
states cannot, by entering into a treaty among themselves, alter the application of customary international law vis-à-vis third states. This result would
contravene the pacta tertiis rule that treaties cannot alter the obligations or
rights of third states without their consent.135 In other words, unless IOs are
bound by customary international law vis-à-vis nonmember states, the IOs’
member states could evade settled limits on their capacity to contract
around customary international law.
Consider the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (“NATO”) and the
AIIB. Even if they wished to, NATO’s member states simply could not
establish an organization unbound by general international law in its inter131. See, e.g., Koskenniemi, supra note 128, ¶ 108 (“[A]side from jus cogens, there may be other types
of general law that may not permit derogation. In regard to conflicts between human rights norms, for
instance, the one that is more favorable to the protected interests is usually held overriding. At least
derogation to the detriment of the beneficiaries would seem precluded.”); see also id. ¶ 109 (“Whether
derogation by way of lex specialis is permitted will remain a matter of interpreting the general law.
Concerns that may seem pertinent include at least the following: the normative status of the general law
(is it jus cogens?), who the beneficiaries of the obligation are (prohibition to deviate from the law benefiting third parties, including individuals or non-state entities); whether nonderogation may be otherwise
inferred from the terms of the general rule (for instance its ‘integral’ or ‘interdependent’ nature, its erga
omnes character, or subsequent practice creating an expectation of non-derogation).”); Curtis A. Bradley &
Mitu Gulati, Withdrawing from International Custom, 120 Yale L.J. 202, 211–12 (2010) (“It is accepted
that a CIL [customary international law] rule can be overridden by a later-in-time treaty, but only as
between the parties to the treaty. In that case, the CIL rule continues to bind nonparty states as well as
parties in their relations with nonparty states. As a practical matter, therefore, the treaty-override option
not only requires obtaining the agreement of other nations, but also that the CIL obligation be such that
a nation can differentiate in its conduct between parties to the treaty and nonparties. This will not be
possible for some CIL obligations, such as those that concern the human rights obligations of a nation to
its citizens or the resource or environmental obligations of a nation with respect to something regarded as
a global commons (such as the air, the seabed, or outer space.”).
132. Koskenniemi, supra note 128, ¶ 60 (“A special rule is more to the point . . . than a general one
and it regulates the matter more effectively . . . than general rules. This could also be expressed by saying
that special rules are better able to take account of particular circumstances. The need to comply with
them is felt more acutely than is the case with general rules. They have greater clarity and definiteness
and thus often felt ‘harder’ or more ‘binding’ than general rules which may stay in the background and
be applied only rarely. Moreover, lex specialis may also seem useful as it may provide better access to what
the parties may have willed.”).
133. Contra Tomuschat, supra note 53, at 135 (arguing that IOs should be bound by “ordinary”
customary international law norms to preclude states from evading their international obligations).
134. See supra notes 52–54 and accompanying text.
135. See VCLT, supra note 57, art. 34.
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actions with nonmember states. At the same time, nothing prevents
NATO’s member states from authorizing NATO to enter into treaties with
nonmember states to take actions that would otherwise be prohibited by
customary international law governing use of force. NATO has done so
through status-of-forces agreements with nonmember states like
Afghanistan.136
With respect to the AIIB, recall that general international law requires
states to complete environmental impact assessments before undertaking industrial projects with significant adverse transboundary effects.137 The
AIIB’s member states cannot eliminate or modify this obligation to nonmember states by entering into a treaty among themselves. Nor can they do
so by establishing the AIIB. For this reason, if the AIIB funds projects that
would significantly and adversly affect nonmember states, the AIIB will have to
undertake environmental impact assessments—whether its member states
would prefer to avoid that obligation or not. At the same time, the AIIB’s
member states have considerable discretion to elaborate or modify the application of general international law when it comes to the AIIB’s interactions
with its member states. Relieving the bank of obligations to undertake environmental impact statements for projects that exclusively affect member states
may well be misguided. But international law does not prohibit the AIIB’s
member states from doing just that.
When it comes to an IO’s interactions with its member states, general
international law binds the organization except to the extent that the member states have made clear their desire to diverge from it. This conclusion
accords with the ordinary rule in treaty interpretation that treaties are presumed not to contract around general international law unless they do so
expressly.138
This view also finds some support in case law. In 2002, the United States
led an initiative to oust José Bustani, the director-general of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (“OPCW”), arguing that
Bustani had engaged in polarizing and confrontational conduct and had mismanaged the organization.139 On April 22 of that year, the Conference of the
136. See, e.g., Agreement Between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Islamic Republic
of Afghanistan on the Status of NATO Forces and NATO Personnel Conducting Mutually Agreed
NATO-led Activities in Afghanistan, Sept. 30, 2014, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_
116072.htm.
137. Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay, supra note 110, ¶ 204.
138. See, e.g., Pauwelyn, supra note 29, at 205–07, 240–42; Koskenniemi, supra note 128, ¶ 37
(citing Jennings and Watts for the presence of a “presumption that the parties intend something not
inconsistent with generally recognized principles of international law”); Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI)
(U.S. v. Italy), Judgment, 1989 I.C.J. Rep. 15, 31, ¶ 50 (July 20) (“The Chamber has no doubt that the
parties to a treaty can therein either agree that the local remedies rule shall not apply to claims based on
alleged breaches of the treaty; or confirm that it shall apply. Yet the Chamber finds itself unable to
accept that an important principle of customary international law should be held to have been tacitly
dispensed with, in the absence of any words making clear an intention to do so.”).
139. See Sean D. Murphy, U.S. Initiative to Oust OPCW Director-general, 96 Am. J. Int’l L. 711 (2002).
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States Parties—the principal organ of the OPCW140—voted to terminate
Bustani’s appointment, effective immediately.141 Bustani then filed suit at
the International Labor Organization’s Administrative Tribunal, which had
jurisdiction over employment disputes with the OPCW.142 Bustani argued
that the Conference of the States Parties lacked the authority to dismiss him
before the end of his term absent a criminal or quasi-criminal offense and
without providing due process.143 The Administrative Tribunal agreed: in
its view, allowing the Conference of the States Parties to fire the OPCW’s
director-general for any reason and without due process would “contravene[ ] the general principles of the law of the international civil service.”144
In the absence of explicit provisions authorizing the Conference of the States
Parties to dismiss the director-general at will, the Administrative Tribunal
found that the Conference of the States Parties was required to act consistently with default rules supplied by general international law.145
3. Treaties
As explained earlier, some scholars have advanced the view that member
states’ treaty obligations “transitively bind” the IOs of which those states
are members, or that IOs necessarily lack the authority to violate their member states’ treaty obligations because states cannot transfer to IOs the authority to violate their treaty obligations.146 The argument that states lack
the capacity to establish IOs that are unbound by their treaty obligations
harkens back to an argument made by early international law scholars, including Emmerich de Vattel, that states lack the capacity to enter into conflicting treaty obligations.147 Having entered into a treaty with one state to
do one thing, a state could not subsequently enter into another treaty with a
different state to do the opposite: the later treaty would be void.148 Consistent with this view, Hersch Lauterpacht, the ILC’s second special rapporteur
on treaties, proposed a general rule (with some exceptions) providing that a
140. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction art. 8.B.19, opened for signature Jan. 13, 1993, 1974 U.N.T.S. 45.
141. Murphy, supra note 139, at 712. Bustani later argued that the real motivation the United States
sought to fire him was “the Bush administration’s fear that chemical weapons inspections in Iraq would
conflict with Washington’s rationale for invading it.” Marlise Simons, To Ousted Boss, Arms Watchdog Was
Seen as an Obstacle in Iraq, N.Y. Times, Oct. 14, 2013, at A4.
142. Bustani v. Org. for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, Judgment No. 2232 (ILO Admin.
Trib. July 16, 2003).
143. Id.
144. Id. ¶ 16.
145. This argument assumes that the “general principles of the law of the civil service” constitute a
subset of general principles of international law. As noted earlier, exactly what counts as a general principle is contested. See supra notes 27 & 31–32 and sources cited therein.
146. See supra notes 61–64 and accompanying text.
147. Wolfram Karl, Conflicts Between Treaties, in 4 Encyclopedia of Public International Law
935, 937 (Rudolf Bernhardt ed., 2000).
148. Id. (“[Vattel] and many other writers conceived the question as one of incapacity to conclude the
later treaty, and thus as a question of essential validity.”).
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treaty would automatically be void “if its performance involves a breach of a
treaty obligation previously undertaken by one or more of the contracting
parties.”149
At bottom, the view that member states’ treaty obligations automatically
limit IOs is an argument about how to avoid—or resolve—conflicts between treaties that establish substantive obligations and treaties that establish IOs. If, for example, the IMF is bound by the ICESCR because the
IMF’s member states are so bound, the IMF will have legal obligations to
avoid working at cross-purposes with its member states’ obligations under
the ICESCR. At first glance, this might seem like an attractive way to avoid
the risk that states will evade their treaty obligations.
This section ultimately concludes that this view is wrong—and that IOs
are not automatically limited or bound by their member states’ treaty obligations. Before explaining why, however, it is necessary to distinguish several
possible variations of the argument that member states’ treaty obligations do
limit or bind IOs; these variations lead to different conclusions about which
obligations bind IOs. First, what fraction of an IO’s member states must be
bound before the IO is bound? Is an IO bound by the treaty obligations of
any IO member state? Only those treaty obligations common to all of its
member states? Or only some of those obligations? Second, there is a question of timing. Are IOs bound only by those treaty obligations that (all,
some, or one of) their member states took on before establishing the IO? Or
are IOs also bound by the treaty obligations that (all, some, or one of) their
member states take on after creating the IO?
Recognizing these complications, Olivier De Schutter argues that if the
rationale for binding IOs is that states cannot transfer to IOs more powers
than they have, then IOs should be limited by the treaty obligations of any
member state.150 On this view, what matters are states’ treaty obligations at
the moment they become members of an IO. Even so, De Schutter points
out, an IO’s obligations might change over time as its membership changes.
Specifically, an IO’s authority would shrink if it accepted new member
states bound by more extensive treaty obligations than the IO’s earlier member states.151 Indeed, De Schutter concludes that this account of IOs’ obligations is defensible in theory but unworkable in practice because IOs would
become straitjacketed by their member states’ manifold treaty
obligations.152

149. Hersch Lauterpacht (Special Rapporteur on the Law of Treaties), Second Report on the Law of
Treaties, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/63 (1953), reprinted in [1953] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 90, 156–59, U.N.
Doc. A/CN.4/SER/A/1953/Add.1; see also Hersch Lauterpacht, Second Report on the Law of Treaties, U.N.
Doc. A/CN.4/87 (1954), reprinted in [1954] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 123, 133–39, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/
SER/A/1954/Add.1.
150. De Schutter, supra note 34, at 64.
151. Id.
152. Id.
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At the end of the day, the view that IOs are automatically bound by the
treaty obligations of their member states, or that states lack the authority to
empower IOs to take actions that would contravene their international obligations, cannot be correct. The problem with this view goes beyond the
adverse practical consequences De Schutter identified. The problem is far
more fundamental. This view, in all its permutations, contravenes the VCLT
rules that govern treaty conflicts. It is also in serious tension with the normative principles that animate those rules. As explained in more detail below, the VCLT rejects Vattel and Lauterpacht’s views on treaty conflicts,
and for good reason.153
To see the problem, start with what might initially appear to be the
strongest case for the view that member states’ treaty obligations transitively
bind IOs in order to prevent states from circumventing those obligations.
Suppose three states—A, B, and C—enter into a treaty, and those same
three states subsequently establish an IO with authorities that relate to the
same subject matter as the earlier treaty. Because all of the IO’s member
states are parties to the treaty at the time they establish the IO, it might be
superficially appealing to say that the IO they create ought to be bound by
the prior treaty too.
Nothing in the VCLT, however, supports that conclusion. When the
same group of states enters into two successive treaties relating to the same
subject matter, the VCLT sets out some default rules but ultimately leaves it
to the participating states to determine how to structure the relationship
between the two treaties to the extent they conflict.154
153. The ILC’s third special rapporteur, Gerald Fitzmaurice, worried that holding treaties invalid on
account of conflicting obligations would unfairly penalize parties to the later treaty, who may not be
aware that their treaty partners had previously entered into treaties with conflicting obligations. See G.G.
Fitzmaurice (Special Rapporteur on the Law of Treaties), Third Report on the Law of Treaties, U.N. Doc. A/
CN.4/115 (1958), reprinted in [1958] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 20, 41–42, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER/A/
1958/Add.1. Fitzmaurice also worried that a rule prescribing invalidity on account of conflicting obligations would introduce undesirable rigidity into international law; many international regulatory efforts
evolved through the development of new treaties that did not necessarily bind all of the parties to the
prior treaty. Id. at 43–44. Given the manifold purposes that treaties serve, Fitzmaurice urged caution
before prescribing invalidity as the solution to treaty conflicts, and he suggested that invalidity was
appropriate only in a handful of exceptional cases. See Humphrey Waldock (Special Rapporteur on the
Law of Treaties), Second Report on the Law of Treaties, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/156 (1963), reprinted in [1963] 2
Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 36, 56 ¶ 14, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER/A/1963/Add.1. The fourth special rapporteur, Humphrey Waldock, went even further and eliminated altogether any role for invalidity in
dealing with treaty conflicts (except those involving jus cogens). Waldock and Fitzmaurice agreed that the
solution to conflicting treaty obligations was state responsibility, not invalidity. See Humphrey Waldock
(Special Rapporteur on the Law of Treaties), Third Report on the Law of Treaties, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/167
(1964), reprinted in [1964] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 5, 44 ¶ 34, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER/A/1964/Add.1.
That is, the conflicting treaties would both remain valid, but the state that entered into the conflicting
obligations would face the consequences of breaching one treaty or the other. The existence of a conflicting treaty obligation would not excuse the breach. The VCLT ultimately codified Waldock’s position;
only treaties that violate jus cogens are void. VCLT, supra note 57, art. 53.
154. VCLT, supra note 57, arts. 30(2)–(3), 59. As the International Law Commission put it when the
provision that became article 30 was being formulated, “the parties to the earlier treaty are always
competent to abrogate it, whether in whole or in part, by concluding another treaty with that object.”
Humphrey Waldock (Special Rapporteur on the Law of Treaties), Third Report on the Law of Treaties, U.N.
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Accepting the argument that the common treaty obligations of an IO’s
member states automatically bind the IO at the moment of its establishment would diminish the very wide discretion that states have under the
VCLT to shape and revise their treaty obligations. When the same group of
states first enters into a treaty and subsequently creates an IO that is unbound by the obligations in the earlier treaty, those states are not evading
anything. They are modifying their obligations, in the same way that states
might modify otherwise applicable customary international law by creating
lex specialis. Because such modifications are wholly compatible with international law, there is nothing impermissible or even especially troubling about
states choosing to establish an IO that is unbound by treaty obligations to
which those same states previously agreed.
Now consider the more complicated case, in which the parties to an IO
charter (states A, B, and C, and no other states) overlap only partially with
the parties to a separate treaty imposing substantive obligations (states A, B,
and D, and no other states). Again assuming that the IO’s activities relate to
the same subject matter as the treaty between A, B, and D, do the obligations in the treaty between states A, B, and D affect the IO established by
states A, B, and C? The answer might depend on which treaty came first in
time.
Suppose first that A, B, and C, establish the IO before A, B, and D enter
into the separate treaty. This hypothetical tracks the participation and sequencing of the IMF and the ICESCR: the IMF opened its doors in 1945,
some three decades before the ICESCR entered into force,155 and the IMF’s
membership partially overlaps with state parties to the ICESCR.156 Considering the IMF transitively bound by the ICESCR would have significant
consequences. First, it would violate the pacta tertiis rule, pursuant to which
the ICESCR should not have any legal consequences for nonparties. Second,
it would bypass the carefully designed amendment procedures in the IMF’s
charter, pursuant to which proposed amendments go into effect only after
the Board of Governors approves them and at least “three-fifths of the members, having eighty-five percent of the total voting power” formally accept
them.157 Finally, it would arguably nullify a provision in the ICESCR that
explicitly addresses the relationship between the ICESCR and the IMF charter. Article 24 of the ICESCR states:
Doc. A/CN.4/167 (1964), reprinted in [1964] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 5, 38 ¶ 13, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/
SER/A/1964/Add.1.
155. The ICESCR entered into force on January 3, 1976. See ICESCR, supra note 73.
156. The IMF has 189 member states, of which 164 are parties to the ICESCR. See List of Members,
IMF, https://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/memdir/memdate.htm (last updated May 10, 2016) (last visited June 23, 2016); ICESCR Member List, U.N. Treaty Collection, https://treaties.un.org/pages/
viewdetails.aspx?chapter=4&lang=en&mtdsg_no=iv-3&src=treaty (last updated June 23, 2016) (last
visited June 23, 2016). Twenty-five states are members of the IMF but not parties to the ICESCR;
Liechtenstein, North Korea, and Palestine are parties to the ICESCR but not members of the IMF. Id.
157. IMF Articles of Agreement, supra note 70, art. XXVIII(a).
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Nothing in the present Covenant shall be interpreted as impairing the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and of the
constitutions of the specialized agencies [including the IMF]
which define the respective responsibilities of the various organs
of the United Nations and of the specialized agencies in regard to
the matters dealt with in the present Covenant.158
Under the VCLT, this provision is surely relevant to the relationship between the ICESCR and the IMF charter. Indeed, the IMF’s former general
counsel argued that this provision confirms that the ICESCR “does not affect” the IMF’s charter, “including its mission and governing structure.”159
Ignoring this provision and concluding that the ICESCR automatically
binds the IMF would effectively elevate the ICESCR’s provisions to jus cogens
status, contrary to the VCLT’s accordance of equal status to treaties. For all
these reasons, IOs should not be bound by treaties to which a subset of their
member states later become parties.
Now suppose that states A, B, and D entered into the substantive treaty
before states A, B, and C established the IO. Does the treaty between A, B,
and D affect the kind of IO that states A, B, and C can establish? If states
can only transfer to an IO the lowest common denominator of powers among
them (as De Schutter suggests ought to be the case if we take seriously the
principle that states cannot transfer to an IO more power than they have160),
then the answer is yes. But that is not the VCLT’s answer.
The VCLT sets out a two-part rule for dealing with conflicting treaties
where the parties to the later treaty do not include all of the parties to the
earlier treaty.161 For states that are parties to both treaties, the later-in-time
rule applies: the earlier treaty applies only to the extent that its provisions
are compatible with those of the later treaty. When it comes to the relationship between a state that is a party to both treaties and a state that is a party
to only one of the treaties, a different rule applies: the treaty to which both
states are parties governs their mutual rights and obligations.
To illustrate, suppose that states A, B, and C are parties to the first treaty
and states A, B, and D are parties to a second treaty. As between A and C,
the earlier treaty governs. As between A and D, the later treaty governs. If
the later treaty includes provisions that conflict with the earlier treaty, A
could have an international obligation to do one thing with respect to C
while simultaneously having an international obligation to do a different
thing with respect to D. Complying with both international obligations
might be literally impossible. In these circumstances, the VCLT does not
privilege one obligation over the other; both obligations are equally valid.162
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

ICESCR, supra note 73, art. 24.
Gianviti, supra note 3, at 119.
See supra notes 150–52 and accompanying text.
VCLT, supra note 57, art. 30(4)–(5).
Pacta sunt servanda, the principle that treaties must be obeyed, applies to both obligations.
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Instead, the VCLT leaves it to A to choose the obligation with which it will
comply and the obligation that it will breach.163 But, importantly, the
VCLT makes clear that if A chooses to comply with its obligation to C, it
will incur international responsibility for the breach to D, and vice versa.164
Under these rules, it is wrong to say that A can “evade” its obligation to C
by entering into an incompatible obligation with D. A will still incur international responsibility for any breach of its treaty with C.
In short, there is no rule of treaty law that prohibits states from entering
into treaties and becoming members of IOs that work at cross-purposes.
Except for treaties that violate jus cogens, the VCLT never prescribes invalidity
of a treaty as the consequence of a treaty conflict. Under the VCLT, then,
states are perfectly free to create IOs that do not share their member states’
pre-existing treaty obligations—although states that do so could face responsibility for violating those obligations.
In some cases, states will be able to avoid a breach of their treaty obligations by ensuring that IOs adopt particular policies. Consider, for example,
the Waite and Kennedy v. Germany case before the European Court of Human
Rights.165 The case involved a potential conflict between Germany’s obligations as a member of the European Space Agency (“ESA”) and its obligations as a party to the European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”).
Waite and Kennedy argued that by according immunity to the ESA and
precluding German courts from hearing their employment dispute with the
ESA, Germany had violated its obligation under article 6 of the ECHR to
guarantee a right of access to courts. The European Court of Human Rights
rejected Waite and Kennedy’s claim, but emphasized that a “material factor” in its decision was the availability of a “reasonable alternative means to
protect effectively their rights under the Convention.”166 In particular,
Waite and Kennedy had recourse to an independent body set up specifically
for resolving employment disputes with the ESA.167 In the absence of this
mechanism for reconciling Germany’s obligations under the ECHR with its
obligations to provide immunity for the ESA, Germany would have faced
consequences for failing to comply with its obligations under the ECHR,
including the payment of “just satisfaction” to Waite and Kennedy.
163. Pauwelyn, supra note 29, at 427 (“With the law stepping back, a principle of political decision
takes its place whereby it is left to the party to the conflicting obligations to decide which treaty it
prefers to fulfill.”) (quoting Wolfram Karl).
164. VCLT, supra note 57, art. 30(5) (specifying that VCLT article 30(4) is “without prejudice . . . to
any question of responsibility which may arise for a State from the conclusion or application of a treaty
the provisions of which are incompatible with its obligations towards another State under another
treaty”); see also Marko Milanovic, Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties
242 (2011) (“Just as I can conclude two equally valid contracts whereby I commit to sell the same thing
to two different people, and then have to face a choice as to which obligation to fulfill and which to
breach and hence suffer the consequences, so a state can enter into two mutually contradictory, yet
equally valid treaties, from which the only escape is a political one.”).
165. Waite & Kennedy v. Germany, App. No. 26083/94, 30 Eur. Ct. H.R. 261 (1999).
166. Id. ¶ 68.
167. Id. ¶ 69.
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But there is a wrinkle here that needs to be addressed. Specifically, the
circumvention problem threatens to resurface because of an important difference between states entering into ordinary treaties containing conflicting
obligations and states establishing an IO that is authorized or required to
take action that violates a member state’s treaty obligation. This discontinuity results from IOs’ separate legal personality—and the possibility that the
conduct that causes the breach of the treaty obligation will be attributed
exclusively to the IO, thereby putting the breaching state into a position to
say: “I did not undertake the wrongful act; the IO did. Therefore, the IO
should bear international responsibility, not me.”168 If this argument is accepted, then the breaching state will be able to avoid consequences for
breaching its treaty obligations. And if the breaching state can avoid the
consequences of the breach, there is a circumvention problem.
This concern is not merely hypothetical. In the wake of the 1999 NATO
bombing campaign in the former Yugoslavia, the then-Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia brought ten individual cases against NATO members, seeking
provisional measures requiring each of those states to “cease immediately its
use of force and . . . refrain from any act of threat or use of force against the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.”169 Because the ICJ’s jurisdiction over contentious cases is limited to states, Yugoslavia could not file a case against
NATO directly. In response, France argued, among other things, that the
conduct forming the basis for Yugoslavia’s case was attributable exclusively
to NATO—not to France.170 Because it dismissed all ten cases on jurisdictional grounds, the ICJ never ruled on this argument.171
At first glance, France’s argument sounds plausible—and therefore the
risk of circumvention is significant. Under the IO Responsibility Articles,
the conduct of IO organs, IO officials, and IO agents is generally attributed
to the IO itself.172 But these attribution rules do not allow IOs’ member
168. For a state (or IO) to be responsible for a violation of international law, the act or omission
constituting the wrongful conduct must be attributable to that state (or IO). State Responsibility Articles, supra note 113, art. 2; IO Responsibility Articles, supra note 1, art. 4.
169. Application of Yugoslavia, Legality of Use of Force (Yugo. v. Can.), 1999 I.C.J. (Apr. 29);
Application of Yugoslavia, Legality of Use of Force (Yugo. v. Fr.), 1999 I.C.J. (Apr. 29); Application of
Yugoslavia, Legality of Use of Force (Yugo. v. Ger.), 1999 I.C.J. (Apr. 29); Application of Yugoslavia,
Legality of Use of Force (Yugo. v. Italy), 1999 I.C.J. (Apr. 29); Application of Yugoslavia, Legality of
Use of Force (Yugo. v. Neth.), 1999 I.C.J. (Apr. 29); Application of Yugoslavia, Legality of Use of Force
(Yugo. v. Port.), 1999 I.C.J. (Apr. 29); Application of Yugoslavia, Legality of Use of Force (Yugo. v.
Spain), 1999 I.C.J. (Apr. 29); Application of Yugoslavia, Legality of Use of Force (Yugo. v. U.K.), 1999
I.C.J. (Apr. 29); Application of Yugoslavia, Legality of Use of Force (Yugo. v. U.S.), 1999 I.C.J. (Apr.
29).
170. Legality of Use of Force (Yugo. v. Fr.), Preliminary Objection, 1999 I.C.J. 26–29 (July 5),
http://www.icjcij.org/docket/files/107/10873.pdf.
171. The ICJ dismissed the cases against Spain and the United States in 1999. Legality of Use of
Force (Yugo. v. U.S.), Provisional Measures, 1999 I.C.J. Rep. 916 (June 2); Legality of Use of Force
(Yugo. v. Spain), Provisional Measures, 1999 I.C.J. Rep. 761 (June 2). The eight remaining cases were
dismissed five years later. See John Crook, Court Finds No Jurisdiction in NATO Bombing Cases, 99 Am. J.
Int’l L. 450 (2005).
172. IO Responsibility Articles, supra note 1, arts. 6, 7.
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states to dodge the consequences of breaching their treaty obligations because the analysis does not end there. The ILC’s commentary makes clear
that attributing conduct to IOs does not preclude also attributing conduct
(and responsibility) to states in the same set of circumstances.173
In some cases, states will not be able to avoid the consequences of a breach
because their treaty obligations will encompass their interactions with an
IO.174 Returning to the IMF and the ICESCR, the ICESCR supervisory
body—the Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights—has
trained its attention not only on the domestic policies that states adopt, but
also on their interactions with the IMF. Thus, the Committee has directed
wealthier states like Belgium that are in a position to influence the IMF’s
policy decisions to do “all [they] can to ensure that the policies and decisions” of the IMF “are in conformity with the obligations of States parties to
the Covenant.”175 To states like Morocco that borrow from the IMF, the
Committee strongly recommended that their “obligations under the Covenant be taken into account in all aspects of [their] negotiations” with the
IMF “to ensure that economic, social, and cultural rights, particularly of the
most vulnerable groups of society, are not undermined.”176 Even if the ultimate decisions that the IMF takes are attributed to the IMF, Belgium’s
interactions with the IMF are attributable to Belgium, while Morocco’s interactions with the IMF are attributable to Morocco.
In other cases, the conduct attributable to member states is the implementation of an IO decision or obligation of IO membership. Consider
Waite and Kennedy again. In state responsibility terms, the conduct that was
attributable to Germany—and that potentially put Germany in breach of

173. See IO Responsibility Articles, supra note 1, art. 3 cmt. 6 (“The fact that an international organization is responsible for an internationally wrongful act does not exclude the existence of parallel responsibility of other subjects of international law in the same set of circumstances.”); see also id. pt. 5 cmt. 2
(“Not all questions that may affect the responsibility of a State in connection with the act of an international organization are examined in the present draft articles. For instance, questions relating to attribution of conduct to a State are covered only in the articles on the responsibility of States for internationally
wrongful acts. Thus, if an issue arises as to whether certain conduct is to be attributed to a State or to an
international organization or to both, the present articles will provide criteria for ascertaining whether
conduct is to be attributed to the international organization, while the articles on the responsibility of
States for internationally wrongful acts will regulate attribution of conduct to the State.”). The decision
of the European Court of Human Rights in Behrami and Saramati has been rightly excoriated for ignoring
the possibility of attributing conduct to both IOs and states. See Marko Milanovic & Tatjana Papic, As
Bad as It Gets: The European Court of Human Rights’s Behrami and Saramati Decision and General International Law, 58 Int’l & Comp. L.Q. 267 (2009).
174. See IO Responsibility Articles, supra note 1, art. 58 cmt. 5 (States may have primary obligations
that “encompass the conduct of a State when it acts within an international organization. Should a breach
of an international obligation be committed by a State in this capacity, the State would . . . [incur
responsibility] under the articles on the responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts.”).
175. Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Belgium),
¶ 31, U.N. Doc. E/C.122/1/Add.54 (Dec. 1, 2000); see also, e.g., Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Italy), ¶ 20, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/A/Add.43 (May 23,
2000).
176. VCLT, supra note 57, art. 59.
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the ECHR—was adopting the legislation and regulations that provided for
the ESA’s immunity.177
Returning to France’s argument in the NATO bombing case, it should be
similarly straightforward to identify conduct that is attributable to France.
One could point to the decision by French government officials to vote in
favor of authorizing the bombing campaign. Or one could point to France’s
participation in carrying out that authorization. The general point is that it
should usually be possible to identify actions attributable to a state in connection with its participation in an IO.178 And so long as this is the case,
states will not be able to avoid the consequences of breaching their treaty
obligations when they participate in an IO that engages in conduct that is
inconsistent with those treaty obligations.
In the end, the argument that states should not be able to evade their
international obligations by joining with other states to establish an IO does
successfully explain why certain international rules bind IOs. It explains
why jus cogens binds IOs and why general international law binds IOs as a
default matter. But it fails to establish that member states’ treaty obligations automatically bind IOs.
III. IOs as Peers of States
While the IOs-as-vehicles view focuses on the vertical relationship between states and IOs, the IOs-as-peers view emphasizes their horizontal relationship. Not merely the servants of states, IOs are powerful and
autonomous actors on the world stage. They can enter into treaties and call
states to account for violations of international law. IOs might extend or
withhold loans to economies on the brink of collapse (as the IMF has done)
or govern territory (as the United Nations did in Kosovo and East Timor).179
Indeed, it is this combination of independence and power that generates
anxiety about how international law binds IOs.
177. See also Nada v. Switzerland, App. No. 10593/08, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 121 (2012) (finding measures
imposed and other acts taken to implement Security Council resolutions imposing targeted sanctions
attributable to Switzerland).
178. A potentially difficult case could arise where a state unsuccessfully opposed the decision by the IO
that violated its treaty obligations and that state did not take any steps to implement the IO decision. In
this situation, it may be trickier to identify conduct that is attributable to the state. That said, the
concern that the state is acting through an IO to evade its treaty obligations is more attenuated in this
kind of situation because the state is taking affirmative steps to align the organization’s actions with its
treaty obligations.
179. Ralph Wilde, Enhancing Accountability at the International Level: The Tension Between International
Organization and Member State Responsibility and the Underlying Issues at Stake, 12 ILSA J. Int’l & Comp. L.
395, 396 (2006) (“For those states that become the target for concerted international intervention, the
power wielded by international organizations can be acute, especially in circumstances where international organizations assert administrative prerogatives over territory.”). For a discussion of the United
Nations’ role in Kosovo, see infra notes 256–58. For a discussion of conditionality in IMF lending, see
Woods, supra note 69, at 25–26, 40–43 (2006).
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In thinking through the implications of this view, the relationship between new states and international law supplies a strikingly on-point analogy. In fact, IOs and new states have a lot in common: they are independent
actors on the international stage with the potential to undermine the international legal order if they are free to ignore international law. And from the
moment that they emerge, new states are bound by jus cogens, and, as a
default matter, by customary international law and general principles. This
is so even though new states had no opportunity to participate in forming
those rules—and therefore no opportunity to protest or opt out of any they
might have found objectionable.180
The best account of these obligations grounds them in new states’ status
as members of the international community.181 The members of this community exist side by side in a horizontal relationship with one another. They
also share and act on a conviction that certain reciprocal rules bind them.182
All states—including new states—share certain rights and obligations by
virtue of their status as members of the international community and regardless of their individual consent. After all, international law could not
function “if there were white spots on the map with States not bound by any
legal rule and therefore not legally prevented from acting in the most irresponsible and irrational manner.”183
Or consider entities that de facto meet the criteria for statehood even
though they are not recognized as states. Such entities are in a horizontal
relationship with established states: no other power has authority over
them.184 And established states treat such entities as having both rights and
obligations under international law.185 Thus, for example, in 1968 the
United States protested when North Korea seized a U.S. naval vessel sailing
180. See, e.g., Danilenko, supra note 42, at 113–16; Weil, supra note 42, at 434 (“It is this opportunity for each individual state to opt out of a customary rule [during its period of formation pursuant to
the persistent objector rule] that constitutes the acid test of custom’s voluntarist nature.”).
181. Christian Tomuschat, Obligations Arising for States Without or Against Their Will, 241 Recueil
des Cours 195, 218–19, 227, 305–06 (1993); Thomas M. Franck, The Power of Legitimacy
Among Nations 190–92 (1990); Hermann Mosler, The International Society as a Legal
Community (1980); Danilenko, supra note 42, at 13–14 (“[W]hile the existing divisions indeed prevent far-reaching integration and community actions in many areas, there has always been at least one
element that served as a sufficient ground for basic legal integration of the community of states. States
have always recognized that there are some fundamental principles of international law of both procedural and substantive character which unite them into a legal community governed by law.”). Some scholars have expressed doubts about this account of international obligations. See, e.g., Eyal Benvenisti,
Sovereigns as Trustees of Humanity: On the Accountability of States to Foreign Stakeholders, 107 Am. J. Int’l L.
295, 301 & n.27 (describing doubts as to whether the requisite shared sense of group solidarity exists).
182. Mosler, supra note 181, at 1–2; Franck, supra note 181, at 197 (“The difference between a
rabble or even a primitive association and a developed community is the latter members accept reciprocal
obligations as a concomitant of membership in that community, which is a structured, continuing association of interacting parties.”).
183. Tomuschat, supra note 53, at 306.
184. Mosler, supra note 181, at 46 (“It follows from the very fact that no other power has authority
over them, that they must have a certain status in international relations.”).
185. Id. at 43 (“The State of Israel was, from the very beginning of its existence in 1948, at war with
its Arab neighbours. They never recognized it as a State, but the laws and customs of warfare binding
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on the high seas as a violation of international law—even though the United
States did not recognize North Korea as a state at the time.186 Indeed, if
North Korea were not bound by these rules it would be in a position not
only to cause genuine harm but also to undermine established international
law governing navigation on the high seas.
Just so with IOs. Like new and de facto states, IOs are in a horizontal
relationship with established states; indeed, this horizontal relationship is a
defining feature of IOs. Furthermore, as increasingly significant and autonomous actors in the international legal system, IOs would constitute “white
spots on the map” if unregulated by international law. Thus, under the IOsas-peers view, IOs—like other members of the international community—
must be bound by certain rules for the international legal system to
function.
A. Foundations of the IOs-as-peers View
The view that IOs are peers—and, like states, members of the international community—finds support in IOs’ exemption from the regulatory
control of any single member state, in ICJ opinions that have bolstered IOs’
status under international law, and in the on-the-ground autonomy that IOs
enjoy.187 And, of course, IOs’ legal status encourages states to view IOs as
their peers, making it easier for IOs to act independently.
1. Insulation from Individual States’ Authority
Like states (and unlike natural persons, corporations, and NGOs), IOs are
regulated exclusively by international law and by their internal legal orders,
although they may consent to abide by particular national (or subnational)
regulations. The primary mechanism for ensuring that IOs remain outside
individual states’ regulatory authority is immunity. States take on international obligations to recognize IOs’ immunities in the international agreements that establish IOs or in subsequently negotiated headquarters
agreements.188 These international agreements typically render IOs immune
from all judicial process and render IO employees and officials immune for

belligerent States under international law were applicable to the struggle between them and the several
cease-fire, armistice and disengagement of forces agreements were valid under international law.”).
186. See U.N. Security Council Begins Debate on Korea, 58 State Dep’t Bull. 194, 194-97 (1968).
187. Scholars writing about the international community as a source of (some) international obligations have suggested that IOs are members of the international community without delving into the
implications of this status. See, e.g., Franck, supra note 181, at 184; Mosler, supra note 181, at xv;
Danilenko, supra note 42, at 12–13.
188. See, e.g., Michael Wood, Do International Organizations Enjoy Immunity Under Customary International Law?, 10 Int’l Org. L. Rev. 287 (2013).
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all acts taken in their official capacities.189 These agreements usually also
shield IO premises, archives, and communications.190
For example, New York City cannot—and does not—enforce its fire code
in the U.N. Headquarters. On paper, the city’s fire code applies: according
to the U.N. Headquarters agreement, federal, state, and local laws apply to
U.N. Headquarters unless the United Nations has adopted inconsistent regulations, and the United Nations does not appear to have done so.191 But the
New York Fire Department can inspect U.N. Headquarters for compliance
only with the United Nations’ consent.192 In fact, the fire department has
inspected the U.N. Headquarters just once since it was built in the
1940s.193 It took the city nine months to secure permission for that 2007
inspection, which identified 866 violations.194 But New York City had almost no leverage to insist that the United Nations address those violations.
The mayor’s office was reduced to threatening that “the city [would] be
forced to direct the cessation of all public school visits to the United Nations” if the headquarters were not brought up to code.195
Likewise, IOs need not comply with federal employment discrimination
laws, including Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. That is why, for example,
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit dismissed a suit against the
World Bank by a former employee alleging that she was the victim of sexual
harassment and discrimination.196 In affirming the World Bank’s immunity,
the court explained:
Like the other immunities accorded international organizations,
the purpose of immunity from employee actions is rooted in the
need to protect international organizations from unilateral control
by a member nation over the activities of the international organization within its territory. The sheer difficulty of administering
multiple employment practices in each area in which an organization operates suggests that the purposes of an organization could
be greatly hampered if it could be subjected to suit by its employees worldwide. But beyond economies of administration, the very
189. See, e.g., United Nations Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations,
Feb. 13, 1946, 1 U.N.T.S. 15; United Nations Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the
Specialized Agencies, Nov. 21, 1947, 33 U.N.T.S. 261; The International Organizations Immunities
Act, 22 U.S.C. § 288 (1945).
190. See, e.g., Agreement Regarding the Headquarters of the United Nations, U.S.-U.N., June 26,
1947, 61 Stat. 3416, 11 U.N.T.S. 11 (subsequently supplemented and amended).
191. See id. art. III §§ 7–8.
192. See id. art. III § 9(a) (“The headquarters district shall be inviolable. Federal, state or local officers
or officials of the United States, whether administrative, judicial, military, or police, shall not enter the
headquarters district to perform any official duties therein except with the consent of and under conditions approved by the Secretary-General.”).
193. Anthony Ramirez, Bringing the U.N. Up to Code, N.Y. Times (Nov. 23, 2007), http://www.ny
times.com/2007/11/23/nyregion/23lives.html.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Mendaro v. World Bank, 717 F.2d 610 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
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structure of an international organization, which ordinarily consists of an administrative body created by the joint action of several participating nations, requires that the organization remain
independent from the international policies of its individual
members.197
IOs’ immunity from national courts thus plays an important practical role in
safeguarding IOs’ independence.
IOs’ immunity from national courts also suggests IOs’ status as peers of
states. After all, states’ immunity from suit in each other’s courts reflects, in
part, the principle that “legal persons of equal standing cannot have their
disputes settled in the courts of one of them.”198
2. Status and Capacities on the International Plane
Two influential ICJ opinions have contributed to IOs’ capacity to act as
peers of states. The first, the 1949 Reparation for Injuries opinion, held that
the United Nations has separate legal personality from its member states
and therefore has the independent capacity to pursue claims for violations of
international law.199 The second—the previously discussed WHO-Egypt
opinion—held that the WHO and the states that host its offices have mutual obligations to consult in good faith in the event that either party wishes
to relocate WHO offices.200 Both opinions reflect the view that, while IOs
are different from states, IOs and states interact on the same plane in the
international legal system. Like states, IOs can make international law,201
break international law, be victims of violations of international law, and
call other actors to account for such violations.
In Reparation for Injuries, the ICJ considered whether the United Nations
could bring an international claim on its own behalf against a state that had
failed to protect a U.N. agent. At the time that the General Assembly requested the opinion, an extremist faction in Israel had just assassinated
Count Bernadotte, the U.N. Mediator in Palestine.202 Israel was not then a
U.N. member.
197. Id. at 615–16.
198. Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law 321 (6th ed. 2003) (translating
the maxim par in parem non habet jurisdictionem).
199. Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1949
I.C.J. Rep. 174 (Apr. 11) [hereinafter Reparation for Injuries Advisory Opinion].
200. WHO-Egypt Advisory Opinion, supra note 5, ¶¶ 48–49; see also supra notes 36–39 and accompanying text.
201. While the question of whether IOs can directly contribute to the formation of customary international law is contested, IOs have entered into thousands of treaties. Three decades ago, IOs were
already parties to more than 2000 treaties. Catherine Brölmann, The Institutional Veil in Public International Law: International Organizations and the Law of Treaties 125–28
(2007).
202. David J. Bederman, The Reparation for Injuries Case: The Law of Nations Is Transformed into International Law, in International Law Stories 307–16 (John E. Noyes et al. eds., 2007).
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The first notable feature of the Reparation for Injuries opinion is that the
ICJ did not hesitate to assume that nonmember states could have international law obligations to the United Nations. The ICJ simply accepted that
the reparations claim arose “from a failure by the State to perform obligations of which the purpose is to protect the agents of the Organization in the
performance of their duties.”203 Just as states have a duty under international law to protect other states’ nationals within their territories, the Court
seemed to reason, so too could a state (even a nonmember state) have comparable obligations with respect to U.N. agents.204 In making this assumption
without further comment, the ICJ telegraphed its willingness to equate the
status of states and IOs.
Second, the ICJ framed its analysis around the question of whether a level
playing field existed between states and the United Nations. Traditionally,
when one state violated its international obligations and failed to protect
another state’s nationals, the injured individuals could not themselves call
the violating state to account. Instead, the individuals’ state of nationality
could espouse the claim and seek reparation from the offending state. As the
ICJ explained, an international claim “takes the form of a claim between
two political entities, equal in law, similar in form, and both direct subjects
of international law.”205 The methods for presenting international claims are
thus designed for peers. They include protest, request for an inquiry, and
negotiation; international claims cannot be submitted to an international
tribunal “except with the consent of the States concerned.”206
The question for the ICJ was, in essence, whether the United Nations
could use those methods for resolving disputes among peers—or whether
the United Nations’ member states needed to espouse the claim first, as they
would if their nationals had been injured. The Court equated asking
whether the United Nations has legal personality with asking “whether the
Charter has given the Organization such a position that it possesses, in regard to its Members, rights which it is entitled to ask them to respect.” 207
The ICJ held that the United Nations does have legal personality separate
from its member states and thus could itself pursue international claims. To
support this conclusion, the ICJ cited the purposes for which the United
Nations was established, the intentions of its founding states, and the
United Nations’ practice of entering into treaties. This practice, the ICJ
averred, “confirmed” the character of the organization, “which occupies a
203. Reparation for Injuries Advisory Opinion, supra note 199, at 177.
204. See Damrosch et al., International Law 1062 (5th ed. 2009) (citing, inter alia, the William
E. Chapman Claim (U.S. v. Mexico) 4 U.N. Rep. Int’l Arb. Awards 632 (1930) (holding Mexico liable
for failure of its authorities to take appropriate steps to protect a U.S. Consul who was shot and seriously
wounded after threats to U.S. diplomatic and consular representatives had been communicated to Mexican authorities)).
205. Reparation for Injuries Advisory Opinion, supra note 199, at 177–78.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 178 (emphasis added).
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position in certain respects in detachment from its Members, and which is
under a duty to remind them, if need be, of certain obligations.”208 As a
separate legal person under international law, the United Nations enjoys
rights under international law as well as the capacity to “maintain [those]
rights.”209 In other words, the ICJ’s conclusion emphasized the co-equal status of states and the United Nations. The ICJ nonetheless took pains to
emphasize that the United Nations was not “‘a super-State,’ whatever that
expression may mean.”210
Finally, the ICJ’s separate conclusion that all states must recognize the
United Nations’ legal personality—not just its member states—likewise reflects the status of the United Nations as a peer of states. The ICJ’s analysis
on this point is rather thin; it consists of a single sentence affirming that
fifty States, representing the vast majority of members of the international community, ha[ve] the power, in conformity with international law, to bring into being an entity possessing objective
personality, and not merely personality recognized by them alone,
together with capacity to bring international claims.211
The ICJ held that once the United Nations emerged on the international
scene, all states had to respect its rights under international law—not just
the United Nations’ member states.212 The parallel is clear: states have obligations toward all other entities that de facto meet the criteria for statehood,
not just those they formally recognize.213
Three decades later, the World Health Assembly asked the ICJ to resolve
the dispute between the WHO and Egypt over the legal requirements for
relocating the WHO’s regional office.214 Once again, the ICJ issued an opinion that characterized the relationship between the IO and one of its mem208. Id. at 179.
209. Id.
210. Id. The written statement submitted by the United Kingdom suggests that the states negotiating the U.N. Charter did not expressly provide for the United Nations’ international personality because
there “was apparently some apprehension—for which there is no basis in fact—” that doing so might
“be interpreted as creating a super-State.” Written Statement Presented by the Government of the
United Kingdom Under Article 66 of the Statute of the Court and the Order of the Court Dated 11th
December, 1948, http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/4/11707.pdf.
211. Reparation for Injuries Advisory Opinion, supra note 199, at 185.
212. Mosler, supra note 181, at 36 (“[T]hird parties who are not members of the Organisation and
who have not otherwise recognised it cannot ignore its existence as a subject of international law. In the
event of any contact between them and the Organisation the latter must be treated as a member of the
international community, and relations so established are governed by international law.”).
213. States have obligations to unrecognized states; these include respecting an unrecognized state’s
territorial sovereignty and accepting its right to grant nationality to persons and vessels. Restatement
(Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 202 cmt. c (2006); Nkambo Mugerwa, Subjects of International
Law, in Manual of Public International Law 247, 269 (Max Sorenson ed., 1968); see also Crawford, supra note 56, at 26–27 (noting that denial of recognition to an entity otherwise qualifying as a
state does not entitle the nonrecognizing State to act as if the latter is not a State, such as by ignoring its
nationality or intervening in its affairs).
214. See supra notes 36–39 and accompanying text.
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ber states as a relationship between peers. That relationship was the product
of “common action based on mutual consent”; its “very essence” is “a body
of mutual obligations of cooperation and good faith.”215 Before delineating
the specific obligations of the WHO and Egypt, the ICJ surveyed a number
of host agreements, the provisions of the VCLT, and the draft articles that
would later become the VCLT-IO. It then observed that these provisions
“are based on an obligation to act in good faith and have reasonable regard
to the interests of the other party to the treaty.”216 The ICJ thus concluded
that “on the basis of the legal relations between the Organization and Egypt
under general international law, under the Constitution of the Organization
and under the agreements in force between Egypt and the Organization,” a
possible transfer of the regional office entailed a duty on both the WHO and
Egypt to “consult together in good faith,” to ensure any transfer of the
regional office occured “in an orderly manner and with a minimum of
prejudice to the work of the Organization and the interests of Egypt,” and
following a “reasonable period of notice.”217 In other words, the WHO and
Egypt needed to approach and resolve their disputes as peers operating
within the international legal system.
3. On-the-ground Autonomy
As a practical matter, IOs—and especially their secretariats—operate
with significant autonomy. This autonomy is not unbounded, of course. But
IO officials, especially those in leadership positions, share the “first-mover”
capacities that executives in national governments enjoy.218 They can set
agendas, define problems, and delimit the range of acceptable solutions, using their prestige and visibility both to influence representatives of member
states and to go “over the heads” of those representatives by directly addressing the public.219 IO bureaucracies enjoy legitimacy and power that
stems from their apparently neutral and impersonal technocratic decisionmaking style.220 IOs’ expertise and their control over information that is not
readily available to other actors—including their member states—reinforce

215. WHO-Egypt Advisory Opinion, supra note 5, ¶ 43.
216. Id. ¶ 47.
217. Id. ¶ 49.
218. Cf. Terry M. Moe & William G. Howell, The Presidential Power of Unilateral Action, 15 J.L.
Econ. & Org. 132, 138 (1999) (describing the first-mover advantages that presidents enjoy because of
the discretion, opportunities, and resources that are available to them).
219. Thomas M. Franck, Nation Against Nation: What Happened to the U.N. Dream and
What the U.S. Can Do About It 94–133 (1985); Ian Johnstone, The Secretary-General as Norm Entrepreneur, in Secretary or General? (Simon Chesterman ed., 2007).
220. Michael N. Barnett & Martha Finnemore, The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations, 53 Int’l Org. 699, 707–10 (1999).

\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLI\57-2\HLI206.txt

unknown

Seq: 41

1-NOV-16

9:13

2016 / How & Why International Law Binds International Organizations 365
their authority.221 This combination of discretion, resources, and authority
gives international civil servants a significant role in making policy.
IOs’ international legal status and legal authorities reinforce this autonomy. For example, IOs’ independent legal personality not only imbues the
actions or omissions of IOs with legal consequences, but also signals that
IOs are to be taken seriously, thus making it easier for IOs to shield themselves from outside interference.222
B. Implications of the IOs-as-peers View
When new states emerge on the international scene, jus cogens norms bind
them; so too does general international law. Treaties do not bind new states
without their consent, with some possible exceptions as a result of state
succession. If the analogy of IOs to new states holds, then the same conclusions would seem to follow for IOs.
But does the analogy hold? Even if they are members of the international
community, IOs are not identical to new states. Indeed, in the Reparation for
Injuries opinion, the ICJ specifically said that concluding that the United
Nations is a legal person is “not the same thing as saying that it is a State,
which it certainly is not, or that its legal personality and rights and duties
are the same as those of a State.”223 Most significantly, states have general
competence to act on the international plane. IOs do not. As the ICJ put it,
IOs are “governed by the ‘principle of speciality,’ that is to say, they are
invested by the States which create them with powers, the limits of which
are a function of the common interests whose promotion those states entrust
to them.”224 The remainder of this Part explores the implications of this
distinction.
1. Jus Cogens and General International Law
One might think that because IOs enjoy only a subset of the authorities
that states do, IOs ought to be bound by only a subset of the obligations
that bind states. For example, should human rights law or the law of the sea
really bind the World Intellectual Property Organization (“WIPO”)? The
purposes for which states established WIPO have nothing to do with either.
WIPO’s objectives are “to promote the protection of intellectual property
throughout the world through cooperation among States” and to facilitate
implementation of certain international agreements related to the protection
221. Id. at 707–15 (describing how IOs structure knowledge by (1) classifying the world and creating
categories of actors and action; (2) fixing meanings in the social world; and (3) articulating and diffusing
new norms, principles, and actors around the globe).
222. Jan Klabbers, The Concept of Legal Personality, 11 Ius Gentium 35, 61–65 (2005); David J.
Bederman, Souls of International Organizations, 36 Va J. Int’l L. 275, 374.
223. Reparation for Injuries Advisory Opinion, supra note 199, at 179.
224. Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict, Advisory Opinion, 1996
I.C.J. Rep. 226, ¶ 25 (July 8).
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of intellectual property.225 To achieve these objectives, WIPO is authorized
to “encourage the conclusion of international agreements designed to promote the protection of intellectual property” and to “assemble and disseminate information concerning the protection of intellectual property.”226
Perhaps only those international law norms that relate to the content of
the WIPO Convention should bind WIPO. To put it more generally, perhaps IOs’ international law obligations should parallel their limited authorities. Thus, a small slice of general international law would bind WIPO; a
different (but also small) slice of international law would bind the InterAmerican Tropical Tuna Commission. Given its broader purposes and the
broader range of its authorities, a larger slice would bind the United
Nations.
But reviewing the explicit authorities enumerated in an IO’s charter is
not an especially good way to understand the scope of the IO’s activities.227
Two common approaches to interpreting IO charters both validate and perpetuate expansive charter interpretations. The first is the implied powers
doctrine. IOs have not only the powers their charters confer explicitly, but
also “those powers which, though not expressly provided in the Charter, are
conferred upon [them] by necessary implication as being essential to the
performance of [their] duties.”228 Separately, IO practice informs the interpretation of IO charters,229 and consideration of practice tends to expand the
range of permissible IO activity.230 The possibility that IO activities might
expand—including in ways that their member states do not necessarily foresee—suggests that IOs’ international law obligations must extend at least
somewhat beyond those that touch on the powers their charters formally
confer.
Consider WIPO again. As the “principal purveyor of technical assistance
on [intellectual property] issues,” WIPO can both facilitate and undermine
individuals’ access to medicine.231 For that reason, WIPO’s actions or omissions may affect the extent to which individuals enjoy a (human) right to
health.232 The point is not that WIPO clearly has obligations in connection
with the right to health, but that human rights law is not categorically
225. Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization art. 3, July 14, 1967.
226. Id. art. 4.
227. Alvarez, supra note 17.
228. Reparation for Injuries Advisory Opinion, supra note 199, at 182.
229. IO charters are usually treaties, and the VCLT, which sets out the method for interpreting
treaties, including IO charters, indicates that the subsequent practice of the parties is relevant to interpreting them. See VCLT, supra note 57, art. 31(3)(b).
230. See, e.g., Alvarez, supra note 17, at 124 (describing how subsequent practice led to an interpretation of the Charter that expanded the General Assembly’s authority to assess U.N. members for certain
kinds of organizational expenses); see also Julian Arato, Treaty Interpretation and Constitutional Transformation: Informal Change in International Organizations, 38 Yale J. Int’l L. 289 (2013).
231. Ruth L. Okediji, The Role of WIPO in Access to Medicines, in Balancing Wealth and Health
(Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & César Rodrı́guez-Garavito eds., 2014).
232. ICESCR, supra note 73, art. 12(a) (“The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the
right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health.”).
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irrelevant to WIPO’s work. Indeed, since IOs’ activities can grow in unanticipated ways, it is difficult to assert with confidence that any particular
subset of general international law is wholly irrelevant to any given IO. To
put it another way, it is difficult to see why powers explicitly conferred
should be subject to international legal constraints while powers implicitly
conferred are not.
Even so, some rules of international law might seem completely irrelevant
to some IOs. Is there really reason to consider WIPO bound by, say, the law
of the sea? I argue that there is, in part because there is always a possibility
that IOs will engage in ultra vires conduct. Imagine that overzealous WIPO
officials started patrolling the territorial seas of coastal states that, in their
view, were too lax in enforcing laws protecting intellectual property. If another state undertook such action without the consent of the coastal state,
that state would have violated the law of the sea.233 Should WIPO really be
able to evade international responsibility on the ground that its action was
lawless even under its own charter?
When it comes to states, the probability that a state will (or will not)
violate a particular norm does not affect whether that norm binds that state.
The law of the sea binds landlocked states as well as those with long coastlines. Limits on the use of force bind states with small or nonexistent militaries. The principle of speciality does mean that particular IOs might be
especially unlikely to contravene some general international law rules. But
the principle of speciality does not render violations impossible. For that
reason, it does not justify limiting IOs’ international obligations to match
their limited authorities.
As members of the international community, then, when IOs emerge they
are bound by jus cogens and by general international law as a default matter,
just as new states are. The states establishing the IO might, by means of the
IO’s charter, alter the general international law rules that would otherwise
apply between themselves and the IO. But the states establishing the IO
cannot alter the general international law rules that govern their own and
the IO’s relationship to nonmember states. In other words, the states creating the IO cannot create a new “white spot” on the map when they establish
an IO.234 Over time, IOs, like states, will be bound by new general interna-

233. Under the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, coastal states exercise sovereignty over their
territorial seas, subject to the right of ships of all states to enjoy the right of innocent passage through the
territorial seas. Patrolling in this way would not qualify as innocent passage. United Nations Convention
on the Law of Sea art. 2, 17–19, Dec. 10, 1982. Virtually all states view these provisions as reflecting
customary international law. See Raul (Pete) Pedrozo, Is It Time for the United States to Join the Law of the
Sea Convention?, 41 J. Mar. L. & Com. 151, 156 (2010); Marian Nash Leich, Limits of the Territorial Sea,
83 Am. J. Int’l L. 349 (1989).
234. Likewise, states that voluntarily participate in establishing a new state by means of secession,
dissolution, or merger cannot create a new state that is unbound by general international law vis-à-vis
other states.
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tional law rules as they coalesce, except to the extent that individual IOs
have and exercise the authorities to contract around those default norms.235
2. Treaties
To the extent that IOs are states’ peers and in a horizontal relationship
with them on the international plane, the pacta tertiis rule would seem to
apply to IOs as well.236 The VCLT-IO accords with this view.237 In its commentary to the draft article that extended the pacta tertiis rule to IOs, the
ILC explained: “The principle which the Vienna Convention lays down is
only the expression of one of the fundamental consequences of consensuality.
It has been adapted without difficulty to treaties to which one or more international organizations are parties . . . .”238
If anything, binding IOs to treaty obligations without their consent
would undermine the principle of speciality, which emphasizes that states
create IOs to pursue specific goals by investing them with specific authorities. It is not entirely clear exactly which treaties would bind IOs—or
how—if the pacta tertiis rule did not apply to IOs. But any new treaty obligations would either expand or contract IOs’ authorities through methods
not contemplated in their charters.239 Moreover, the actors who could bind
IOs to treaties without their consent would be empowered at the expense of
others, again in ways that would bypass decision-making procedures set out
in IO charters. Suppose, for example, that the Committee on Economic,
Social, and Cultural Rights could pronounce the IMF bound by the
ICESCR—or that a handful of the IMF’s member states could do so.
Whether good or bad, the consequences would be significant. And they
235. Provided they have the relevant authorities, it seems that IOs would also be able to avoid being
bound by new customary international law norms by persistently objecting to those norms to the same
extent that states can.
236. Of course, IOs are bound by their own charters; the relationship between an IO and its charter
falls outside the scope of the pacta tertiis rule because IOs are not third parties to their charters. Paul
Reuter, the ILC’s Special Rapporteur for the draft articles that became the VCLT-IO, described as “absurd” the question of whether the United Nations was a third party in relation to its Charter. See [1982]
1 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 26, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1982. By way of comparison, he explained that
“[i]n all systems of internal law, it was acknowledged that a corporation was not a third party in relation
to the contract establishing it.” Id.
237. See VCLT-IO, supra note 10, art. 34 (“A treaty does not create either obligations or rights for a
third State or a third organization without the consent of that State or that organization.”).
238. Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties Between States and International Organizations or Between
International Organizations with Commentaries art. 34 cmt., in Report of the International Law Commission
on the Work of Its Thirty-fourth Session, ¶ 63, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.343, reprinted in [1982] 2 Y.B. Int’l L.
Comm’n 42, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1982/Add.1 (Part 2).
239. It is uncontested that an IO’s member states can expand or contract an IO’s authorities, or
impose new international obligations on the IO by following the amendment procedures laid out in the
IO charter. Binding IOs by such amendments does not violate the pacta tertiis rule because, as explained
above in supra note 236, IOs are not third parties or strangers to their charters. Just as states can constitute IOs by agreeing on their charters, states can also change and reconstitute IOs by amending those
same charters.
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would not be the product of decisions made pursuant to the IMF’s Articles
of Agreement.
All that said, there is one exception to the general rule that treaties do not
bind states without their consent and it would seem to apply to IOs as well.
New states may succeed to the treaty obligations of their predecessors in
some circumstances. As new members of the international community, successor states “inherit” certain rights and duties from their “parent states,”
“not by virtue of consent but as a concomitant of status.”240 IOs, too, can
inherit rights and obligations from other IOs.241 A number of commentators
have argued that IOs might, by virtue of functional succession, become
bound by the obligations of their member states. Some scholars have suggested that functional succession will bind IOs in a limited set of cases.242
Others have made or endorsed the argument in a more general way, without
specifying when it would or would not apply.243
I agree that IOs can functionally succeed to the international obligations
of another state or states.244 But succession represents only a tiny exception
to the general rule that IOs cannot be bound by conventional treaty obligations without their consent. This is because the concept of succession depends on the complete replacement or displacement of one entity by
another. Questions of succession arise when new states arise from previously
existing states—for example, when a state becomes independent of another
state of which it had formed a part, a single state disaggregates into two or
more new states, or formerly separate states unify into a single state. Each of
these situations involves the “definitive replacement of one state by another in
respect of sovereignty over a given territory.”245
240. Franck, supra note 181, at 191.
241. International Status of South-West Africa, Advisory Opinion, 1950 I.C.J. Rep. 128, 136 (July
11) (concluding that the United Nations is “legally qualified” to exercise supervisory functions related to
the administration of nonindependent territories assigned to the League of Nations even though those
supervisory functions were “neither expressly transferred to the United Nations nor expressly assumed by
that organization”).
242. Halberstam and Stein explain that an IO “may, at times, find itself indirectly bound by the legal
obligations of its Members. The principal idea here is one of functional legal succession . . . , [which]
roughly holds that when an international organization exercises the powers formerly belonging to a State
or group of States in the context of a particular international legal regime, then such international organization succeeds that group of States not only in their rights but also in their obligations under that
international legal regime.” Halberstam & Stein, supra note 52, at 22–23. They specify that they find
functional succession arguments unconvincing with respect to positive international obligations that
require taking action where the IO’s member states retain some powers to implement those international
obligations. Id. at 48 & n.140.
243. Schermers & Blokker, supra note 12, at 995 § 1574; Reinisch, supra note 6, at 137 (“One
promising road—particularly in light of the transfer of ‘governance’ tasks to international organizations—appears to be a discussion of something like a ‘functional’ treaty succession by international
organizations to the position of their member states.”); Mégret & Hoffmann, supra note 61, at 318.
244. IOs could also potentially succeed to the obligation of another IO under comparable circumstances. See International Status of South-West Africa, Advisory Opinion, supra note 241, and accompanying text.
245. Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law 621 (6th ed. 2003) (emphasis
added); Vienna Convention on the Succession of States in Respect of Treaties art. 2(b), Aug. 22, 1978,
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In other words, functional succession requires more than IOs being peers
in the international legal system that exist alongside states. It requires an IO
to replace or displace a state.246 Such replacement or displacement is quite
rare, implying that functional succession will be quite rare, too. But it can
happen. Take, for example, the European Union (“EU”) and its predecessor,
the European Community (“EC”). The European Court of Justice’s (“ECJ”)
1972 opinion in International Fruit Company NV v. Produktschap voor Groenten
en Fruit held that the EC had succeeded to its member states’ obligations
pursuant to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”).247
Before reaching this conclusion, however, the ECJ found evidence of a complete transfer of authority from the member states to the EC with respect to
trade policy. The ECJ observed that the Community had become wholly
responsible for setting trade policy for its member states, that the GATT’s
other contracting parties “recognized” this “transfer of powers” to the Community, and that the Community has participated in negotiations and has
entered into related trade agreements in its own name.248 Under these circumstances, the ECJ concluded that the relevant GATT provisions bound
the Community, not just its member states.249 The completeness of the
transfer in International Fruit made the analogy to state succession
appropriate.
Still, examples of this kind are very unusual. An IO can properly succeed
to a state’s obligations only if the IO makes final decisions about the policy
that will govern regarding particular matters (like trade) or in a particular
territory. But IOs almost never exercise that degree of control. Most IOs are
in the business of making recommendations. When an IO generates new
international obligations, the IO’s member states almost always retain the
discretion to accept or reject them. The authorities of the EU and its predecessors and certain decisions of the U.N. Security Council are significant
exceptions.250 Even in these cases in which IOs can bind their member states
to new international obligations, individual states usually retain authority
1946 U.N.T.S. 3 (“ ‘[S]uccession of States’ means the replacement of one State by another in the responsibility for the international relations of territory . . . .”).
246. This view is in accord with Halberstam and Stein with respect to positive obligations. See
Halberstam & Stein, supra note 52, at 48 n.140 (“We are less convinced by the application of functional
succession in the absence of exclusive [European] Community powers when the question surrounds a
positive international command to take action—as opposed to a negative prohibition against certain
forms of action. As long as the EC has not by treaty or secondary legislation displaced Member States’
ability to comply with the international obligation, the EC has not substituted itself for the Member
States in that arena.”).
247. Joined Cases 21-24/72, Int’l Fruit Co. NV v. Produktschap voor Groenten en Fruit, 1972 E.C.R.
1219.
248. Id. ¶¶ 14–17.
249. Id. ¶ 18.
250. Other examples are few and far between, and usually involve narrow and technocratic issues. For
example, the International Civil Aviation Organization can adopt rules of air navigation that apply over
the high seas that bind all parties to the Chicago Convention; states do not have the option to opt out of
these rules. Convention Establishing the International Civil Aviation Organization art. 12, Dec. 7, 1944;
see also Guzman, supra note 17, at 1013–17 (discussing other similar examples).

R

R

\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLI\57-2\HLI206.txt

unknown

Seq: 47

1-NOV-16

9:13

2016 / How & Why International Law Binds International Organizations 371
over whether and how they will implement those new obligations. Unless
the IO has the final authority to set policy, functional succession arguments
are inapposite.
Even in those rare circumstances in which an IO does replace or displace a
state, the state’s treaty obligations will not necessarily bind the IO. Successor
states are not always, or even almost always, bound by their predecessors’
treaty obligations.251 Indeed, the law of state succession is unsettled and
fraught with tension. On the one hand, reliance values favor the new state
succeeding to the former state’s treaty obligations. On the other hand, concerns about sovereignty and consent favor a clean slate.252 The 1978 Convention on the Succession of States in Respect of Treaties sets out rules that vary
by context.253 However, fewer than two dozen states are parties, and many of
its provisions remain controversial.254
Consider, for example, the legal disputes about succession that have arisen
in connection with the United Nations’ recent experience in territorial administration. From 1999 to 2008, the United Nations partially displaced
Serbia and Montenegro and exercised all governmental authority—legislative, executive, and judicial—in Kosovo.255 The United Nations thus temporarily functioned as a surrogate state, and “assume[d] the classical
functions of a state in the place of domestic authorities.”256 It was never
clear whether the human rights treaty obligations of Serbia and Montenegro
bound the U.N. administration in Kosovo, which was known as UNMIK.257
The U.N. Human Rights Committee, the supervisory body for the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”), thought that
UNMIK was so bound.258 UNMIK itself, however, rejected this view.259 So
251. Gerhard Hafner & Gregor Novak, State Succession in Respect of Treaties, in The Oxford Guide to
Treaties 396 (Duncan Hollis ed., 2012) (“The law and practice of State succession is highly contextual,
with the outcome of each case strongly influenced by the relevant political situation. As a result, there is
no single rule for all cases of treaty succession.”).
252. See generally Detlev F. Vagts, State Succession: The Codifiers’ View, 33 Va. J. Int’l L. 275, 280–84
(1993).
253. For example, article 11 provides that succession does not affect boundaries established by treaty.
See Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties, supra note 245. Part III of the treaty
addresses newly independent states—that is, former colonies—while Part IV addresses “uniting and
separation of states.” Id.
254. See Brownlie, supra note 198, at 633; Hafner & Novak, supra note 251, at 400 (“[T]he applicable international law has remained rather vague, primarily because State practice itself has been and
remains largely inconsistent.”).
255. S.C. Res. 1244, ¶ 10 (June 10, 1999); U.N. Mission in Kosovo Reg. No. 1, ¶ 1 (July 25, 1999).
256. Carsten Stahn, The Law and Practice of International Territorial Administration
494 (2008).
257. Id. at 492–96.
258. Drawing on previous work concluding that the ICCPR categorically binds successor states, the
Human Rights Committee took the position that the U.N. Mission in Kosovo was “bound to respect and
to ensure to all individuals within the territory of Kosovo and subject to their jurisdiction the rights
recognized in the Covenant.” Human Rights Comm., Consideration of Reports Submitted by States
Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant, Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Comm.: Kosovo (Serbia), ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/UNK/CO/1 (Aug. 14, 2006); see also Human Rights Comm.,
General Comment No. 26: General Comment on Issues Relating to the Continuity of Obligations to the
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too did the Venice Commission.260 In other words, treaty norms might
sometimes bind IOs by functional succession. But examples of an IO succeeding a state are few and far between, and even where it occurs there are
unsettled questions about which treaty norms would bind the succeeding
IO.
In the final analysis, then, the IOs-as-peers view—properly understood—
leads to the conclusion that IOs are bound by jus cogens and by general international law as a default matter. And, with possible rare exceptions when
IOs succeed or displace states in the performance of governmental functions,
treaties do not bind IOs without their consent.
IV. IOs’ Own Views
Most scholars writing about IO obligations have not addressed IOs’ own
views on the question of which rules of international law bind them. Up to
this point, this Article has not addressed them either. Whether IOs’ views
are relevant may depend on the theoretical perspective one takes. If IOs are
treated simply as vehicles through which states act, IOs’ views may not
matter much. But IOs’ own views would seem to count if they are peers of
states and full-status members of the international community. The very
existence of such a community depends in part on its members sharing the
conviction that they are part of a community that is governed by certain
rules.261
In addition to their theoretical significance, IOs’ own views about their
legal obligations matter for practical reasons. Formal mechanisms for adjudicating and enforcing IOs’ international obligations are few and far between.262 IOs are simply more likely to comply with obligations that they
themselves accept as binding.263
A number of IOs revealed their views about which international law rules
bind them as the ILC sought to codify and develop the international law
rules that apply specifically to IOs. The first ILC effort culminated in the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.8/Rev. 1
(Dec. 8, 1997).
259. Human Rights Comm., Report Submitted by the U.N. Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo to the Human Rights Committee on the Human Rights Situation in Kosovo Since June 1999, ¶¶
123–24, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/UNK/1 (Mar. 13, 2006).
260. Eur. Comm’n for Democracy Through Law, Opinion on Human Rights in Kosovo, ¶ 78, Opinion No. 280 (Oct.11, 2004), http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDLAD%282004%29033-e. The Venice Commission is an advisory body to the Council of Europe composed
of independent experts. The Commission provides legal advice on a range of issues including fundamental rights.
261. See supra note 181 and accompanying text.
262. Daugirdas, supra note 88.
263. Cf. Tomuschat, supra note 53, at 362 (making this point with respect to states); Anthea Elizabeth Roberts, Traditional and Modern Approaches to Customary International Law: A Reconciliation, 95 Am. J.
Int’l L. 757, 762 (2001) (same).
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VCLT-IO, which was adopted in 1986.264 The second resulted in the Draft
Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations, which the ILC
adopted in 2011.265 Not every IO participated in these debates and even
those that did participate never offered fully developed theories about the
scope of their obligations. Strikingly, as described below, the participating
IOs’ comments reflect broad areas of consensus. The IOs that weighed in
indicated that jus cogens rules bind them, as does general international law
except to the extent that their charters, as lex specialis, contract around it. At
the same time, IOs consistently took the position that they are not bound by
treaties without their consent. In other words, IOs’ own views closely track
the theoretical conclusions sketched above—and hence offer further support
for those conclusions.
A. IOs and the Law of Treaties
The ILC formally took up the topic of treaties to which IOs are parties
shortly after the VCLT was adopted in 1969.266 The ILC’s work provided
IOs with an opportunity to describe both their practice and their understanding of which international law norms bind them. Three points are especially important. First, a number of IOs expressed the view that they were
already bound by those parts of treaty law that constituted customary international law or general principles. Second, these IOs indicated that customary international law norms that developed in the future would also bind
them. Third, IOs categorically rejected the possibility that treaties could
bind them without their consent.
In drafting articles on IO treaties, the ILC did not seek to reinvent the
wheel. Instead, the ILC started with the VCLT and considered, on an articleby-article basis, whether differences between states and IOs required any
changes.267 After provisionally adopting draft articles, the ILC transmitted
them to IOs for their comments.268 When they responded, participating IOs
emphasized the degree to which the VCLT both shaped their practice with
respect to treaties and described the law applicable to IOs. But these IOs
maintained that not all the rules developed for states could carry over auto264. United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties Between States and International Organizations or Between International Organizations, Vienna, Austria, Feb. 21–Mar. 21, 1986, Final Act of
United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties Between States and International Organizations or Between
International Organizations, ¶ 19, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.129/14 (1986).
265. IO Responsibility Articles, supra note 1, at 53 ¶ 82.
266. See G.A. Res. 2501 (XXIV), ¶ 5 (Nov. 12, 1969).
267. Paul Reuter (Special Rapporteur), Second Report on the Question of Treaties Concluded Between States
and International Organizations or Between Two or More International Organizations, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/271,
reprinted in [1973] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 75, 77 ¶¶ 9–12, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1973/Add.1.
268. Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Thirty-first Session, U.N. Doc. A/34/10,
reprinted in [1979] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 79, 138 ¶ 84, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1979/Add.1 (Part
2).
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matically to IOs.269 Where those rules did not directly translate, IOs invoked their own practice for ascertaining and developing the relevant
rules.270
Consider, for example, the comments that the International Labor Organization submitted in 1980:
A preliminary question concerns the extent to which the articles
innovate, or are merely declaratory of existing custom or practice.
There would seem to be little doubt that—since conventional arrangements falling outside the internal law of organizations have
had to draw on existing principles of international law—major
rules of treaty law, such as the principle of pacta sunt servanda
[treaties are to be obeyed] or the rules concerning the interpretation of treaties, have long been applied by those concerned.271
Not only did the ILO report that its own practice conformed to the major
rules in the VCLT, but the ILO also suggested that these rules already
bound IOs.272
Other IOs likewise indicated that they applied the VCLT in practice and
considered themselves bound by at least some aspects of it. For example, the
United Nations explained that “the method following in the United Nations practice has been to apply in principle the established international
legal rules concerning treaties between States, and to modify these rules only
so far as necessary in view of the special requirements of the United
Nations.”273
269. For example, article 7 of the VCLT, captioned “full powers,” identifies those persons who can
represent states for the purpose of adopting, authenticating, and consenting to treaties. Because those
persons hold titles that IO officials do not share (e.g., head of state, head of government, minister of
foreign affairs), these rules needed to be adapted to apply to IOs. VCLT, supra note 57, art. 7.
270. See, e.g., Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Thirty-third Session, U.N. Doc.
A/36/10, reprinted in [1981] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 197, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1981/Add.1 (Part
2) (“The United Nations treaty practice may be said to find its legal basis principally in the intendment
of the Charter as interpreted and accepted through practice. It follows that in the case of the United
Nations the practice of the Organization is an essential source of the rules of international law governing
the subject of treaties between the United Nations and States and/or international organizations.”); see
also id. at 198 (“The draft articles in section 2, in so far as they are not essentially particular applications
of the principle of pacta sunt servanda and of the will of the parties, appear to be codification de lege ferenda
as far as the United Nations is concerned. This observation is based on the fact that the United Nations
has not developed any general, let alone established, practices with respect to reservations, objections to
reservations, and acceptance, opposition, or withdrawal of reservations and opposition to reservations.”).
271. Id. at 199.
272. Id. (“[T]he main rules of treaty law are binding on the organizations irrespective of the terms of
the convention” on IO treaties that might ultimately be negotiated.).
273. Id.; see also Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Thirty-fourth Session, U.N.
Doc. A/CN.4/L.343, reprinted in [1982] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 137, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1982/
Add.1 (Part 2) (“In the day-to-day legal practice of the IAEA, resort is frequently had to the [VCLT],
which is treated as a ‘handy manual’ of the law affecting the Agency’s treaties with states and other
organizations and other treaties of interest to it to which only States are parties.”) (statement of the
International Atomic Energy Agency); id. at 145 (“[T]he spirit, if not the letter, of most of the rules
established in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties applies fully to both types of treaties; in
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After formally adopting the draft articles on IO treaties on July 1, 1982,
the ILC recommended that the General Assembly start the process of embedding them into a treaty.274 But some IOs were nervous. Like the draft
articles that formed the basis for the VCLT, the draft articles on IO treaties
blended codification and progressive development. IOs voiced serious concerns about how the ILC’s draft articles—especially those that reflected progressive development rather than existing customary international law—
might come to bind them.275
The United Nations and the specialized agencies276 developed and
presented their views through the Administrative Committee on Coordination (“ACC”).277 In November 1982, the ACC submitted to the General
Assembly a statement identifying several “legally sound” ways that a treaty
based on the ILC’s draft articles might bind IOs.278 First, IOs and states
could become parties to the treaty on the same footing. Second, IOs might
formally adopt, accept, or consent to a treaty to which only states would be
parties.279 Notably, both of these methods made some form of express IO
consent a prerequisite for binding IOs. The final option, the ACC said, was
“quite different.” The General Assembly could adopt the articles “not as an
international convention destined to create legal obligations for the parties
thereto, but as a standard of reference for action destined to harden into
customary international law.”280 The ACC reported that a number of IOs
expressed a preference for this last approach.281
The next month, the General Assembly concluded that it would proceed
with a convention without reaching a decision about the method by which
other words, treaties concluded between States and treaties to which one or more international organizations are contracting parties.”) (statement of the European Economic Community).
274. Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Thirty-fourth Session, U.N. Doc. A/
CN.4/L.343, reprinted in [1982] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 16, ¶¶ 57–58 U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1982/
Add.1 (Part 2).
275. See, e.g., U.N. Doc. A/38/145, at 23 (Sept. 15, 1983) (“[T]he draft articles contain many elements of progressive development of law and as such need to be expressly accepted by international
organizations.”) (comments of the International Atomic Energy Association).
276. The term “specialized agency” is somewhat misleading. The specialized agencies are not
subordinate units of the United Nations; rather, they are independent IOs with their own charters,
members, and budgets—although they do coordinate their work with the United Nations pursuant to
articles 57 and 63 of the U.N. Charter. The specialized agencies include the Food and Agriculture
Organization, the World Health Organization, the International Civil Aviation Organization, and the
World Bank.
277. The ACC was composed of the U.N. Secretary-General and the heads of the specialized agencies.
ECOSOC Res. 13 (III), Sept. 21, 1946. In 2001, ECOSOC renamed the ACC the United Nations System
Chief Executives Board for Coordination.
278. U.N. Doc. A/C.6/37/L.12 (Nov. 18, 1982) (attaching the text of a decision adopted by the
Administrative Committee on Coordination when it met on November 1–3, 1982). The routes identified
by the ACC tracked those identified by the ILO in its submissions to the ILC in 1980. See Report of the
International Law Commission on the Work of Its Thirty-third Session, U.N. Doc. A/36/10, reprinted in [1981]
2. Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 199, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1981/Add.1 (Part 2).
279. UN Doc. A/C.6/37/L.12, at 2–3 (Nov. 18, 1982).
280. Id. at 3.
281. Id.
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the convention would bind IOs.282 In the same resolution, the General Assembly invited comments from a number of IOs, including the specialized
agencies, the International Atomic Energy Agency (“IAEA”), the GATT,
and a number of regional organizations including the Organization of American States, the Organization of African Unity, and the Islamic
Conference.283
Over the next year, some of these IOs submitted comments reflecting
their commitment to the view that they could not be bound by treaty obligations without their consent.284 The United Nations, for example, said that
“[i]t is, of course, clear that . . . an inter-organizational conference could not
bind its participants without their consent, that is, that no agreement could
be imposed on any organization merely by reason of its participation in the
conference.”285 The International Telecommunications Union said that the
creation of obligations and rights for IOs through a convention “simply and
beyond any doubt necessitates such express consent to that convention.”286
When the ACC met in 1983, it adopted a new statement reflecting the
input of the legal advisers of the participating organizations. Like the ACC’s
first statement, it emphasized the indispensable role of IO consent: “The
Legal Advisers considered it essential, and ACC concurs, that no international organization be bound without its explicit consent by a convention
incorporating the draft articles.”287
As ultimately negotiated, the VCLT-IO permits IOs to become parties to
the convention. To date, seventeen IOs have done so, including the United
Nations.288 But the VCLT-IO will not enter into force unless and until
thirty-five states become parties to the treaty289—and only thirty-one have
done so to date.290
Although holding to the view that treaty obligations cannot bind them
without their consent, some IOs that declined to sign the VCLT-IO believe
that key provisions of the VCLT and VCLT-IO nonetheless bind them as
customary international law. For example, none of the international financial
institutions have signed the VCLT-IO.291 The World Bank, for example,
worried that the treaty’s provisions on invalidity, termination, and suspension of treaties were ill-suited for the kinds of long-term financial agree282. G.A. Res. 37/112, ¶ 5 (Dec. 16, 1982).
283. Id. ¶ 3.
284. U.N. Doc. A/38/145, at 18-27 (Sept. 15, 1983); U.N. Doc. A/38/45.Add.1, at 16–45 (Oct. 20,
1983).
285. U.N. Doc. A/38/145/Add.1, at 17–18 ¶ 7 (Sept. 1983).
286. Id. at 37.
287. U.N. Secretariat, Convention on the Law of Treaties Between States and International Organizations or Between International Organizations, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/38/4, at 4 ¶ 11 (Oct. 27, 1983).
288. VCLT-IO, supra note 10.
289. Id. arts. 82–85.
290. Id. art. 85.
291. See U.N. Doc. A/C.6/38/4, ¶ 17 (Oct. 27, 1983) (describing some of the problems perceived by
the IFIs).
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ments the Bank regularly concluded.292 But, as a former general counsel of
the World Bank pointed out, these concerns “have not precluded . . . the
application, in the Bank’s practice, of some of [the VCLT-IO’s] provisions
reflecting customary international law.”293 Indeed, one of his predecessors
emphasized that the legal opinions presented to the World Bank’s executive
directors by the Bank’s general counsel provide a “legal interpretation” of
the Bank’s charter, and “[s]uch interpretation is subject to general rules of
international law developed through centuries of state practice, judicial
precedents, and scholarly works,” including in particular the provisions of
the VCLT that govern treaty interpretation.294
B. IO Charters as Lex Specialis
In 2000, the ILC undertook another project to adapt rules formulated for
states to IOs. After adopting a set of Draft Articles on State Responsibility,
the ILC turned to the task of producing a counterpart set of articles on IO
responsibility. Both sets of articles address the “secondary rules” associated
with violations of international law.295 That is, they address issues like when
conduct can be attributed to states or IOs, defenses that render otherwise
unlawful conduct permissible, and the consequences of violations of international law. Neither set of articles seeks to define the content of the “primary
rules” that bind states or IOs, the breach of which may give rise to responsibility.296 Even so, the topic came up as the ILC developed the IO responsibility articles—especially in relation to the article addressing the role of lex
specialis.
In their comments, participating IOs generally agreed that jus cogens
norms bind them. IOs also embraced the view that their charters constitute
lex specialis—and, as explained below, this view only makes sense against a
background presumption that general international law governs, except to the
extent that states have contracted around it. Their views, in other words, are
predicated on a belief that general international law norms bind IOs as a
default matter.
The subject of IOs’ obligations under jus cogens and customary international law usually arose indirectly as the ILC developed the draft articles.
Some IOs, for example, considered whether an IO could ever incur international responsibility for conduct that was consistent with its charter. The
292. See id.
293. Roberto Dañino, Secretary-General of ICSID and Senior Vice President and General Counsel of
the World Bank, Why Treaties Matter, Opening Remarks, First Annual Conference “Interpretation
Under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties—25 Years On,” at 9 (Jan. 17, 2006), http://sitere
sources.worldbank.org/INTLAWJUSTICE/214576-1139604306966/20817203/WhyTreatiesMatterLon
don011706.pdf.
294. Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, The World Bank in a Changing World 68 (1991).
295. IO Responsibility Articles, supra note 1, at 2 ¶ 3.
296. State Responsibility Articles, supra note 113, at 31 cmt. 1; IO Responsibility Articles, supra note
1, at 2 cmt. 3.
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IMF addressed this issue on more occasions, and in greater depth, than other
IOs. Indeed, when other IOs eventually weighed in, they seemed to be following the IMF’s lead. In 2005, the IMF wrote:
To suggest that acts authorized by and consistent with an organization’s charter are wrongful suggests that the organization’s charter is itself contrary to some higher international obligations. We
can accept this only in cases involving breaches of peremptory
norms of international law, but we find no support for such a
proposition with regard to ordinary norms of international law.297
In other comments, the IMF explicitly framed the argument in terms of lex
specialis:
[W]hen an organization acts in accordance with the terms of its
constituent charter, such acts can only be wrongful in relation to
another norm of international law if the other norm in question is
either a ‘peremptory norm’ (jus cogens) or arises from a specific
obligation that has been incurred by the organization in the
course of its activities (e.g., by entering into a separate treaty with
another subject of international law). However, vis-à-vis all other
norms of international law, both the charter and the internal rules
of the organization would be lex specialis as far as the organization’s responsibility is concerned and, accordingly, cannot be
overridden by lex generalis, which would include the provisions of
the draft articles.298
In 2011, several other IOs submitted comments that echoed the IMF’s
position. They include the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, which said:
The responsibility of an IO can only be challenged when an act is
clearly in breach of its constituent instruments, internal rules and
procedures, or if in accordance with them, is in breach of peremptory norms.299

297. Int’l L. Comm’n, Responsibility of International Organizations: Comments and Observations Received
from Governments and International Organizations, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/556, at 40 (May 12, 2005) (statement
of IMF); see also id. at 47–48 (“It should also be recognized that the rules of an organization are lex
specialis as between the organization and its members and agents and among its members. It is therefore
not possible to suggest . . . that in some cases (other than involving obligations of a peremptory nature)
general international obligations might prevail over the rules of an organization. Such a suggestion ignores the international agreements between the organization’s members regarding the exclusive application of the laws governing their relations and it suggests that lex generalis prevails over lex specialis.”)
(statement of IMF).
298. Int’l Law Comm’n, Responsibility of International Organizations: Comments and Observations Received
from International Organizations, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/582, at 5 (May 1, 2007) (statement of IMF).
299. Responsibility of International Organizations, supra note 15, at 40 (statement of OECD).
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The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe weighed in along
similar lines:
With the exception of the presence of a peremptory norm of general international law, the lex specialis rule is key to resolving potentially conflicting characterization of any act of an international
organization as ‘wrongful or not’ under general international law
vis-à-vis the internal law of the said IO.300
So too did the International Labor Organization and the World Bank.301
Taken together, these comments suggest that charter obligations exhaust
all of an IO’s international obligations vis-à-vis their member states, with
the exception of jus cogens norms. Does this imply that IOs believe they are
unbound by customary international law or general principles?
I argue no. When states create lex specialis, they are not necessarily rejecting general international law. Sometimes lex specialis and general international law point in the same direction: the lex specialis is “an elaboration,
updating, or a technical specification” of the general international law
norm.302 Even when states do intend for lex specialis to diverge from otherwise applicable general international law, general international law norms
persist in the background. Those norms fill gaps and influence the interpretation of the treaty’s terms.303 Indeed, treaties that create lex specialis are
presumed to be consistent with general international law except to the extent that they contract around it.304
Because of this presumption, states need not explicitly incorporate general
international law into IO charters. Those norms are already implicit in IO
charters, and general international law binds IOs except to the extent that
their charters provide to the contrary. In other words, when it comes to IOs’
300. Id. at 40–41.
301. Id. at 38–39 (“[T]he relationship between member states and the organization . . . should be
analysed in the light of the internal legal system of each organization, as created by the constituent
instrument and developed further by the organization’s internal rules and practice. These rules represent
lex specialis and the relationship between the member State and the international organization should not
be subject to general rules of international law for the issues regulated by the internal rules.”) (statement
of ILO); id. at 41 (“Again, as the internal law of the organization is, as a rule, the most significant
component (when not the whole) of lex specialis, will not a special rule prevail over all international
obligations other than those deriving from jus cogens? We cannot think of any dispositive (as opposed to
peremptory) norm that would constitute an exception, precisely because, on any matter that is not governed by a peremptory norm, a general obligation is qualified and superceded by special law, this being
the very purpose of special law.”) (statement of the World Bank).
302. Koskenniemi, supra note 128, ¶ 56.
303. See, e.g., Amoco Int’l Fin. Corp. v. Iran, supra note 129, ¶ 112 (“As a lex specialis in the relations
between the two countries, the Treaty supersedes the lex generalis, namely customary international law.
This does not mean, however, that the latter is irrelevant in the instant Case. On the contrary, the rules
of customary law may be useful in order to fill in possible lacunae of the Treaty, to ascertain the meaning
of undefined terms in its text or, more generally, to aid interpretation and implementation of its provisions.”); Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.) 2003 I.C.J. Rep. 161, ¶¶ 39–78 (Nov. 6) (applying general law
concerning the use of force to give meaning to the term “necessity” in the relevant treaty).
304. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
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interactions with their member states, general international law binds IOs as
a default matter.
The view that IO charters constitute lex specialis also supports the conclusion that general international law binds IOs in their interactions with nonmember states. Indeed, the IMF and the ILO both specify that their charters
constitute lex specialis that governs between themselves and their member states.305
Those statements are consistent with the view, explored above, that IO charters cannot displace or replace customary international law or general principles with respect to nonmember states.
Conclusion
IOs are not exactly new on the international scene. The first IOs date back
to the mid-nineteenth century; they became far more numerous in the wake
of World War II.306 IOs play an increasingly important role in making,
elaborating, implementing, and promoting compliance with international
law. Indeed, few if any areas of international law or policy remain free of
their influence. Yet fundamental questions about how IOs fit into the international legal system remain unanswered. This Article tackles the question
of IO obligations. In short, I argue that IOs are not categorically more or
less bound by international law than states are. Jus cogens norms bind IOs.
Customary international law and general principles do, too—but only as a
default matter. Treaties do not bind IOs without their consent.
These conclusions raise some new questions for future projects. An important set of questions concerns the need to adapt some general international
law norms, in at least some cases, to account for differences between states
and IOs, or for differences among IOs. In particular, some adaptation will be
necessary for those general international law norms that turn on features of
states that IOs lack. For example, important rules of diplomatic protection
turn on nationality; because IOs do not have their own nationals, these rules
must be modified to sensibly apply to IOs.307 Other general international
law rules turn on features like territorial control that IOs share with states
305. See U.N. GAOR, 57th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/556, at 38 (May 12, 2005) (“[T]he rules of an
organization are lex specialis as between the organization and its members and agents and among its members.”)
(emphasis added); see also Responsibility of International Organizations, supra note 15, at 38–39 (“[T]he
relationship between member states and the organization . . . should be analyzed in the light of the internal
legal system of each organization, as created by the constituent instrument and developed further by the
organization’s internal rules and practice. These rules represent lex specialis and the relationship between the
member State and the international organization should not be subject to rules of general international law for
the issues regulated by the internal rules.”) (emphasis added).
306. See generally Bederman, supra note 222; see also Jan Klabbers, The Transformation of International
Organizations Law, 26 Eur. J. Int’l L. 9 (2015).
307. See Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Fifty-eighth Session, U.N. Doc. A/61/
10, at 13, 23–24 (2006) (explaining that there are similarities and differences between diplomatic protection and protection of an agent by an international organization).
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only exceptionally.308 In these cases, adaptation to account for this lack of
territorial control will be necessary in many but not all cases. Sometimes no
adaptation at all will be necessary; for example, it is difficult to see why
international humanitarian law norms regarding targeting would need to be
adapted for IOs. The question of when and how to adapt general international law norms merits further attention.
There is a straightforward way to clarify some difficult questions about
IOs’ obligations: allowing IOs to become parties to the multilateral treaties
that bear on their work. Thus, for example, the IMF might become a party
to ICESCR. This alternative is appealing for several reasons. It would serve
to clarify IOs’ obligations with respect to the subject matter governed by the
treaty (and obviate disputes about whether, for example, a particular norm is
part of customary international law and if so, whether and how that norm
must be adapted for a given IO). Should the treaty include provisions that
need to be modified to apply sensibly to a particular IO, such modifications
could be addressed expressly through reservations. Finally, joining treaties
would subject IOs to any monitoring and enforcement mechanisms that are
built into the underlying treaty. To be sure, this route may not be immediately available. Most multilateral treaties allow only states to become parties;309 these treaties would have to be amended to allow IOs to become
parties. Separately, IOs would have to establish that they have the authority
to become parties and to fulfill the obligations they take on.310 The considerable advantages of this approach suggest that the effort necessary to surmount these obstacles would be worthwhile.
Debates about IOs’ international obligations also raise important questions about how to choose among—or how to reconcile—competing priorities. These debates too implicate the allocation of resources to the various
goals that states and IOs pursue. Not every step that might be desirable for
IOs to take can credibly be characterized as a legal obligation. This Article
provides a framework for distinguishing the credible claims about IOs’ obligations from those that are untenable, while acknowledging that some of the
untenable legal claims may nevertheless reflect sound policy proposals.

308. See supra notes 255–56 (describing the United Nations’ governmental role in Kosovo).
309. See, e.g., ICESCR, supra note 30, art. 26(1) (“The present Covenant is open for signature by any
State Member of the United Nations or member of any of its specialized agencies, by any State Party to
the Statute of the International Court of Justice, and by any other State which has been invited by the
General Assembly of the United Nations to become a party to the present Covenant.”).
310. The EU’s efforts to accede to the European Convention on Human Rights offer a vivid demonstration of the complications that can arise on this front. See Daniel Halberstam, “It’s the Autonomy,
Stupid!” A Modest Defense of Opinion 2/13 on EU Accession to the ECHR, and the Way Forward, 16 German
L.J. 105 (2015).
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